Institute  of  International  Education 

International  Relations  Clubs 
Syllabus  No.  XII 

Limitation  of  Armament 

By  Quincy  Wright,  Ph.D. 


Associate  Professor  of  Political  Science 
University  of  Minnesota 


November,  1921 


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Institute  of  International  Education 

International  Relations  Clubs 
Syllabus  No.  XII 

Limitation  of  Armament 

By  Quincy  Wright,  Ph.D. 


Associate  Professor  of  Political  Science 
University  of  Minnesota 


November,  1921 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 
Columbia  University  Libraries 


https://archive.org/details/limitationofarmaOOwrig 


CONTENTS 


I.  Nature  of  proposals  for  limiting  armament 7 

1 . General  limitation  of  armaments 7 

2.  Neutralization  and  disarmament  of  areas 8 

3.  Restrictions  upon  the  instruments  of  war 8 

4.  Restrictions  upon  the  method  of  acquiring  war  materials 

and  forces  8 

5.  Relation  of  plans  for  preventing  war  to  plans  for  limiting 

armaments 8 

II.  History  of  the  effort  to  limit  armaments  by  international 

agreement 9 

1.  1815-1870  10 

2.  1870-1904  12 

3.  1904-1914  • 15 

4.  1914-1921  17 

III.  Outline  for  Study 22 

A.  Political,  Social  and  Economic  Aspects. 

1.  Need  of  limiting  armaments 22 

2.  Relation  of  armaments  to  foreign  policy 24 

3.  Relation  of  armaments  to  international  organization  ...  28 

B.  Legal  Aspects  30 

4.  Local  disarmament  and  neutralization  30 

5.  Regulation  of  methods  and  instruments  of  war 31 

6.  Regulation  of  methods  of  acquiring  war  materials  and  forces  33 

C.  Technical  Aspects 35 

7.  Armament  limitation  agreements  of  limited  application  . . 35 

8.  General  armament  limitation  agreements 36 

9.  Sanctions  for  observance  of  armament  limitation  agreement . 37 


(3] 


PREFACE 


A great  deal  has  been  written  about  disarmament  in  the  litera- 
ture of  pacifism  but  this  has  been  largely  of  a fugitive  and  propa- 
gandist character.  There  are  comparatively  few  sources  from 
which  the  student  can  obtain  a comprehensive  view  of  the  subject. 
Robert  Coulet  wrote  a doctor’s  thesis  in  French  on  the  subject 
in  1910;  Hans  Wehberg  published  a manual  in  French  in  1914 
at  the  request  of  the  Interparliamentary  Union  and  in  1919  he 
published  an  exhaustive  historical  manual  in  German.  Alfred 
Fried,  the  indefatigable  Austrian  pacifist,  has  covered  the  subject 
in  his  Handbuch  der  Friedensbewegung,  1913.  During  the  fall  of 
1921  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace  translated 
and  published  the  first  of  Wehberg’s  books,  which  deals  with  the 
subject  from  a more  practical  point  of  view  than  the  second. 
This  is  practically  the  only  manual  in  English  and  should  be  in 
the  hands  of  all  students  of  the  subject.  It  includes  as  an  appendix 
the  questionnaire  for  study,  prepared  by  Christian  Lange,  Secre- 
tary of  the  Interparliamentary  Union  in  1914. 

Use  should  be  made  of  the  documents  of  the  two  Hague  Con- 
ferences, the  Peace  Conference  of  Paris  and  the  League  of  Nations, 
many  of  which  have  been  made  available  in  English  through  the 
publications  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace, 
the  American  Association  for  International  Conciliation  and  the 
World  Peace  Foundation.  The  League  of  Nations,  published  by 
the  latter,  has  reprinted  most  of  the  League  documents  dealing 
with  limitation  of  armaments  in  volumes  three  and  four.  The 
Reports  of  the  Lake  Mohonk  Conferences  on  International  Arbitra- 
tion will  also  be  found  useful.  Among  secondary  books  with  sug- 
gestive chapters  on  the  subject  may  be  mentioned  Sir  Thomas 
Barclay,  Collapse  and  Reconstruction,  1919;  N.  M.  Butler,  The 
International  Mind,  1912;  S.  C.  Vestal,  The  Maintenance  of  Peace, 
1920;  J.  L.  Garvin,  The  Economic  Foundations  of  Peace,  1919;  M. 
Erzberger,  The  League  of  Nations,  1919;  Sir  Frederick  Pollock,  The 
League  of  Nations,  1920;  W.  H.  Taft,  The  Covenanter,  1919;  General 

[5I 


Tasker  H.  Bliss,  What  Really  Happened  at  Paris,  1921.  The  state- 
ments of  Generals  Pershing  and  Bliss,  Admirals  Badger  and  Sims, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  Daniels,  Commissioner  Henry  White  and 
others  during  the  Hearings  of  the  House  of  Representatives  Com- 
mittee on  Naval  Affairs,  January  and  February  1921,  are  worth 
reading.  Bibliographies  are  given  in  Krehbiel,  Nationalism,  War 
and  Society;  Duggan,  The  League  of  Nations,  p.  346;  World  Peace 
Foundation,  Pamphlet,  November,  1913.  Q.  W. 

Washington,  November  15,  1921. 


16] 


I. 


NATURE  OF  PROPOSALS  FOR  LIMITING  ARMAMENTS 

Proposed  plans  have  aimed  to  limit  armaments;*  (i)  by  general  reductions 
of  military  and  naval  personnel,  material,  or  budgets;  (2)  by  territorial 
restrictions  upon  the  establishment  or  employment  of  military  or  naval  forces 
and  material;  (3)  by  prohibitions  or  restrictions  upon  the  use  of  particular 
kinds  of  military  or  naval  forces  or  equipment;  and  (4)  by  regulating  the 
manufacture  of  and  trade  in  war  material  and  the  method  of  recruiting  mili- 
tary and  naval  forces.  The  following  resume,  therefore,  includes,  not  only 
proposals  for  a general  limitation  of  national  armaments,  but  also  proposals 
for  limiting  the  area  of  war,  the  instruments  of  war  and  the  method  of  acquir- 
ing war  materials  and  forces. 

I . GENERAL  LIMITATION  OF  ARMAMENTS 

Proposals  for  a general  limitation  of  armaments  have  taken  the  form  of 
suggestions  for  simultaneous  reduction  or  non-augmentation  of  the  effectives 
of  standing  armies  or  of  military  budgets.  Fear  of  the  military  preparations 
of  a possible  rival  coupled  with  a desire  for  economy  seem  to  have  been  the 
motive  for  such  proposals  as  those  of  Louis  Philippe  and  Napoleon  III.  The 
hope  of  better  assuring  the  stability  of  Europe  and  preventing  war  may  have 
been  of  preponderating  importance  in  the  proposals  of  Alexander  I and 
Nicholas  II,  as  has  undoubtedly  been  the  case  with  the  proposals  which  have 
from  time  to  time  emanated  from  private  individuals  or  from  semi-official 
associations  such  as  the  Interparliamentary  Union.  A limitation  of  naval 
armaments  has  been  discussed,  usually  at  the  initiative  of  Great  Britain,  on 
occasions  when  naval  rivalry  has  been  intense,  particularly  during  the  periods 
1840-1860,  and  1904-1914.  A holiday  in  naval  construction  for  a period  of 
from  one  to  three  years  has  been  the  usual  form  of  such  proposals.  The  possi- 

*The  “limitation”  (abstention  from  increase)  of  armaments  may  be  distinguished  from  the  “reduc- 
tion” (general  and  simultaneous  decrease)  of  armaments,  which  in  turn  may  be  distinguished  from 
“disarmament”  (reduction  to  the  minimum  necessary  for  internal  police,  defense  of  frontiers  against 
uncivilized  tribes,  and  international  action  for  the  preservation  of  world  order).  See  B.  F.  True- 
blood.  The  Case  for  Limitation  oj  Armaments,  American  Journal  International  Law,  2:  758  (1908); 
Goulet,  La  Limitation  des  Armements,  1910,  p.  i;  Report  of  Sixth  Committee  to  First  Assembly  of 
League  of  Nations,  December  14,  1920,  First  Assembly  Document,  No.  199  and  Provisional  Ver- 
batim Record  of  First  Assembly,  22;  6.  The  “limitation  of  armaments”  is,  however,  often  used  in 
a general  sense  to  cover  all  three  steps. 


[7] 


bility  of  a general  reduction  of  armaments  has  been  discussed  at  the  Hague 
Conferences  of  1899  and  1907,  and  in  the  Military  Commission,  the  Council 
and  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  since  its  establishment  in  1920. 

2.  NEUTRALIZATION  AND  DISARMAMENT  OF  AREAS 

Limitations  upon  the  area  of  war  have  been  planned  by  the  neutralization 
of  states  and  the  regulation  of  neutrality;  by  the  neutralization  or  disarma- 
ment of  defined  geographical  areas,  especially  lakes,  rivers,  straits,  canals  and 
international  boundaries;  and  by  the  prohibition  or  restriction  of  the  traffic 
in  arms  in  defined  areas,  especially  in  uncivilized  or  insurrectionary  territory. 
Numerous  bi-lateral  and  general  conventions  have  been  concluded  on  these 
subjects. 

3.  RESTRICTIONS  UPON  THE  INSTRUMENTS  OF  WAR 

Limitations  upon  the  instruments  of  war  have  taken  the  form  of  complete 
prohibition  of  certain  inventions  or  types  of  forces ; and  of  prohibition  of  the 
use  of  such  inventions  or  forces  for  certain  purposes.  The  laws  of  war  have 
generally  followed  the  second  of  these  forms,  forbidding  the  use  of  all  military 
materials  and  forces  in  a manner  to  produce  unnecessary  hardship  upon 
enemy  forces,  civilians  or  property.  The  general  law  of  war  or  special  con- 
ventions have  in  a few  cases  prohibited  designated  instruments  of  war  such 
as  poison,  poison  gases,  and  small  explosive  bullets.  The  extension  of  such 
restrictions  to  other  instruments  such  as  submarine  vessels,  and  bombing 
aircraft  has  been  urged. 

4.  RESTRICTIONS  UPON  THE  METHOD  OF  ACQUIRING  WAR 

MATERIALS  AND  FORCES 

Proposals  for  prohibiting  or  regulating  the  private  manufacture  of  arms, 
the  purchase  of  arms  in  neutral  territory,  the  export  and  import  of  war 
material  to  or  from  specified  places,  the  conversion  of  merchant  vessels  into 
war  vessels,  conscription,  the  recruiting  of  uncivilized  colonials  and  other 
methods  of  acquiring  military  instruments  and  forces  have  been  considered 
incidentally  in  discussions  of  a general  limitation  of  armaments.  Such  pro- 
hibitions, while  not  required  by  international  law  as  generally  recognized, 
have  been  the  subject  of  a few  special  treaties. 

5.  RELATION  OF  PLANS  FOR  PREVENTING  WAR  TO  PLANS 

FOR  LIMITING  ARMAMENTS 

Plans  for  voluntary  or  compulsory  judicial  settlement,  arbitration,  media- 
tion, conciliation  or  investigation  of  international  disputes  and  for  combined 
international  action  to  prevent  violations  of  the  peace  have  not  been  included 


[8] 


in  this  resume.  Although  a limitation  of  armaments  has  been  urged  as  a step 
toward  the  elimination  of  war,  the  primary  argument  has  been  economy  and 
amelioration  of  the  hardships  of  war  so  far  as  military  objects  permit.  Efforts 
aimed  directly  at  the  preservation  of  peace  and  the  elimination  of  war  belong 
in  a different  category,  though  doubtless  such  efforts  would,  if  effective,  result 
in  a material  diminution  of  armaments. 


II. 

HISTORY  OF  THE  EFFORT  TO  LIMIT  ARMAMENTS  BY 
INTERNATIONAL  AGREEMENT 

In  the  Chinese  age  of  confusion  (6th  century  B.  C.)  the  northern  Hwang 
Ho  states,  Ts’i  and  Ts’in  formed  a league  to  make  war  against  the  Yangtse 
Valley  state  Ch’u.  The  League  was  successful  and  made  a treaty  incor- 
porating its  rival  and  providing  for  general  disarmament.  This  treaty,  which 
is  said  to  have  kept  the  peace  for  lOO  years,  seems  to  be  the  earliest  arma- 
ment limitation  agreement  on  record. During  the  middle  ages  the  effort  was 
made  to  limit  the  time  during  which  war  was  legitimate  by  the  “Truce  of 
God”  rather  than  to  limit  the  material  of  war.  The  plans  for  international 
organization  of  Dubois  (1305),  Podebrad  (1462),  Sully  (1600),  and  Alberoni 
(1736)  were  aimed  at  the  Turks  and  advocated  an  increase  rather  than  dimi- 
nution of  armaments.  Jean  Bodin  in  his  Six  livres  de  la  Republique  (1577) 
opposed  standing  armies  and  the  Abbe  St.  Pierre  thought  his  Projet  de  la 
Paix  Perpetuelle  (1713)  should  be  favorably  received  because  it  would  lead  to 
a reduction  of  military  expenses.  Kant  opposed  standing  armies  in  his  Von 
Ewigen  Frieden  (1795)  and  Bentham  discussed  the  subject  in  his  book 
written  about  the  same  time  but  not  published  until  1843.* 

The  first  official  proposal  in  modern  times  for  the  limitation  of  national 
armaments  by  agreement  seems  to  have  been  made  by  the  Austrian  Chancel- 
lor, Prince  Kaunitz,  to  Frederick  the  Great  of  Prussia  soon  after  the  Seven 
Years’  War  (1766).®  The  latter  rejected  the  offer.  Two  decades  later,  how- 
ever, in  1787,  France  and  England  actually  agreed  to  discontinue  military 
preparations  and  to  reduce  their  navies  to  a peace  footing.'*  Since  the  Napo- 

* H.  G.  Wells,  The  Outline  of  History,  1921,  i:  205. 

* Robert  Coulet,  La  Limitation  des  Armements,  a doctoral  thesis  of  the  University  of  Paris,  1910 ; 
Wehberg,  Limitation  des  Armements,  Bruxelles,  1914,  translated  by  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
International  Peace,  1921,  pp.  S“6,  and  the  same  author’s  more  exhaustive  historical  research. 
Die  internationale  Beschrdnkung  der  Rustungen,  Stuttgart  und  Berlin,  1919,  pp.  3-9;  Fried,  Hand- 
buck  der  Friedensbewegung,  Berlin  und  Leipzig,  1913,  2:3-56. 

* Fried,  op.  cit.,  2:32. 

‘ Martens,  R.  T.,  and.  ed.,  4:  279,  313;  Wehberg,  Die  internationale  Beschrdnkung  der  Rilstungen, 
pp. 258-260. 

I9] 


Iconic  Wars  discussions  of  the  subject  have  taken  place  with  increasing  fre- 
quency. Four  periods  may  be  conveniently  distinguished:  1815-1870,  1870- 
1904,  1904-1914,  1914-1921. 


I.  1815-1870 

After  the  treaty  of  Vienna,  Europe,  exhausted  by  twenty  years  of  war,  was 
ready  for  peace  and  gained  it  under  the  system  of  Metternich.  National 
armaments  were  of  a size  which  would  seem  insignificant  today,  and  the 
alliance  of  the  great  powers  created  by  the  treaties  of  Chaumont  and  Paris 
which  developed  into  the  so-called  “Concert  of  Europe,”  prevented  the 
development  of  excessive  competition  in  armament  building,®  though  by  1840, 
alarm  began  to  be  manifested  in  Great  Britain  over  the  Russian  and  French 
naval  building,  and  after  the  Crimean  war,  Anglo-French  naval  rivalry 
became  evident.®  Toward  the  end  of  this  period,  the  combined  effect  of 
agitation  for  more  popular  government,  of  movements  for  national  solidarity 
and  of  rivalry  among  the  powers  in  the  Near  East  led  to  a weakening  of  the 
Concert  of  Europe,  a series  of  wars,  and  great  increases  in  the  normal  size  of 
military  establishments  and  budgets.'^ 

The  problem  of  reducing  armaments,  though  relatively  less  important  than 
in  the  later  periods,  was  the  subject  of  occasional  parliamentary  discussion, 
especially  in  England®  and  of  proposals  for  international  agreement  by 
Alexander  I of  Russia  (1816),®  by  Louis  Philippe  of  France  (1831),^®  by  the 
Italian  General  Garibaldi  (1860),*^  by  Richard  Cobden  of  the  British  House  of 
Commons  (1861),^®  and  by  Napoleon  III  of  France  (1863,  1867,  1870).^® 
Prince  Metternich  was  favorable  to  the  idea.^^  Great  Britain,  though  favor- 
ing the  limitation  of  armaments,^®  showed  a tendency  to  fear  political  involve- 
ments^® and  these  proposals  came  to  nothing. 

6 See  Phillips,  The  Confederation  of  Europe,  London,  1913;  Martens,  Recueil  de  Traites  et  Con- 
ventions conclus  par  la  Russie  avec  les  Puissances  Etranghes,  ii:  256, 

'Cobden,  Three  Panics,  Political  Writings,  London,  1903,  2:540;  Encyclopedia  Britannica, 
nth  ed.,  “Navy,”  19:  309. 

t Anderson  and  Hershey,  Diplomatic  History,  Washington,  1918,  p.  468. 

'Hansard,  Debates,  59:403,  144;  1679,  Fried,  op.  cit.  2:73:  Cobden,  op.  cit.  2:544.  691.  The 
subject  was  also  discussed  by  economists  such  as  Bastiat,  CEuvres  Computes,  Paris,  1854,  5:340. 
translated  in  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace.  Division  of  International  Law,  Pam- 
phlet No.  22.  p.  27. 

® Martens,  Traites  conclus  par  la  Russie,  4:  36,  ii:  258;  Carnegie,  pamphlet  No.  22,  p.  i;  Coulet, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  34-46;  Revue  de  droit  international,  26:  573-585. 

^0  Memoirs  of  Prince  Metternich,  New  York,  1882,  secs.  1007,  1008,  1020,  1021. 

n Memoirs  of  Bertha  von  Suttner,  Boston,  1910,  i:  358,  2:  111-114. 

Cobden,  op.  cit.  2:  700. 

'^Archives  Diplomatigues,  1863,  4:  188,  1864,  1:44-82,  364;  Staatsarchiv,  5:459.  509-532;  Car- 
negie, Pamphlet  No.  22,  p.  3;  Lord  Lyons,  a record  of  British  Diplomacy  by  Lord  Newton,  London, 
1913,  i:  246-279;  Fried,  op.  cit.  2:  75,  80;  Coulet,  op.  cit.  pp.  47-72,  Albert  Pingaud,  Revue  de  Paris, 
May  15,  1899.  3:  286-308. 

Supra  note  10. 

Supra  note  8. 

>'  Supra  notes  9 and  13.  Note  of  Lord  John  Russel.  November  1863,  Staatsarchiv,  5:  516;  Archives 
Diplomatigues,  1864,  i:  53. 


Though  no  agreements  for  a general  limitation  of  armaments  were  made 
during  this  period,  several  conventions  attempted  to  limit  the  area  and 
instruments  of  war.  Switzerland  (1815), Cracow  (1815-1846), Belgium 
(1831-1919),^®  the  Black  Sea  (i856-i87i),2®  the  Aaland  Islands  (1856),^^ 
the  Ionian  Islands  (1863),**  and  Luxemburg  (1867-1919),^®  were  neutral- 
ized. Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  agreed  to  refrain  from  arming  on 
the  Great  Lakes  (1817),^^  or  in  a hypothetical  trans-isthmian  canal  (1850- 
1901).^®  The  neutralization  of  trans-isthmian  routes  was  also  provided  in 
American  treaties  with  New  Granada  (Colombia)  (1846),“  Honduras  (1864),^’ 
and  Nicaragua  (1867-1902).^®  In  the  treaty  of  Adrianople  (1829)  Russia  and 
T urkey  agreed  not  to  arm  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube. 

The  use  of  privateers  and  explosive  bullets  under  400  grams  was  pro- 
hibited by  the  declarations  of  Paris  (1856), and  St.  Petersburg  (1868),®® 
ratified  by  most  of  the  powers,  except  the  United  States.  The  immunity  of 
personnel  and  material  for  the  relief  of  the  sick  and  wounded  in  battle  was 
provided  by  the  generally  accepted  Geneva  or  Red  Cross  Convention  of 


Martens,  Nouveau  Recueil  de  Traites,  2:  379,  740;  American  Journal  of  International  Law, 
Supplement,  3:  106;  Willoughby  and  Fenwick,  Types  of  Restricted  Sovereignty  and  of  Colonial 
Autonomy,  Washington,  1919,  p.  84:  See  League  of  Nations,  Official  Journal,  1920,  No.  2,  p.  58,  for 
relation  to  League  of  Nations. 

IS  Martens,  N.  R.,  2:251,  379;  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  2:  1061-1076;  Willoughby 
and  Fenwick,  op.  cit.,  p.  29. 

British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  18:  893;  Martens,  N.  R.,  16:  790;  American  Journal  Inter- 
national Law,  Supplement,  3:  108;  F.  L.  Warrin,  The  Neutrality  of  Belgium,  Washington,  1918.  For 
abandonment  of  Belgian  neutralization,  see  Treaty  of  Versailles,  1919.  Articles  31,  40. 

ss  Treaty  of  Paris,  1856,  Articles  11-14,  American  Journal  International  Law,  Supplement,  3:  114; 
Treaty  between  Russia  and  Turkey,  1856,  Martens,  N . R.  G.,  13:  786. 

“ Treaty  of  Paris,  1856,  Article  33,  and  separate  convention  between  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Russia  of  the  same  date;  Martens,  N.  R.  G.,  15;  773,  788;  Oakes  and  Mowat,  Great  European  Treaties 
of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  1918,  p.  174;  American  Journal  International  Law,  2:  379.  The  decision 
of  the  League  of  Nations  Council,  June,  1921,  awarding  the  Aaland  Islands  to  Finland,  recom- 
mended a new  convention  by  the  Baltic  Powers  to  strengthen  their  neutralization.  Monthly  Sum- 
mary of  the  League  of  Nations,  No.  3.  141.  Report  of  Secretary  General  to  Second  Assembly, 
Document  No.  9,  pp.  18-20. 

^‘‘American  Journal  International  Law,  Supplement  3:  116. 

^Martens,  N.  R.  G.,  18:448;  American  Journal  International  Law,  Supplement  3:  118.  For 
abandonment  of  Luxemburg  neutralization,  see  League  of  Nations,  Assembly,  Provisional  Ver- 
batim Record,  Twenty  Sixth  Plenary  Session,  December  16,  1920,  p.  6. 

^ Malloy,  Treaties,  etc.,  628.  See  also  Senate  Document  No.  9.  Thirty-second  Congress,  Second 
Session,  reprinted  in  Carnegie  EndowmenUfor  International  Peace,  Division  of  International  Law, 
Pamphlet  No.  2.  Barclay,  Problems  of  International  Practice  and  Diplomacy,  1917,  p.  79. 

Malloy,  Treaties,  etc.,  pp.  659,  782. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  312;  American  Journal  International  Law,  Supplement  3:  108. 

Malloy,  Treaties,  etc.,  p.  957. 

Ibid.,  p.  1285.  Free  navigation  of  the  Danish  Sounds  was  assured  by  treaties  of  1857  (Ibid., 
p.  389)  but  there  was  no  provision  for  neutralization.  Treaties  of  1658,  1759,  and  1780  had  attempted 
to  exclude  war  from  the  Baltic  (Barclay,  1907,  p.  73). 

29  Declaration  of  Paris,  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  61:  155;  Martens,  N.  R.,  15:  731;  Hig- 
gins, The  Hague  Peace  Conferences,  Cambridge,  1909,  p.  i. 

•"  Declaration  of  St.  Petersburg,  Martens.  N.  R.,  18:  450;  Higgins,  op.  cit.  p.  5. 


1864.®^  The  attempted  extension  of  this  convention  to  naval  war  in  1868 
was  not  accepted  until  the  first  Hague  Conference  of  1899.®® 

2.  1870-1904 

The  second  period  was  initiated  by  the  Franco-Prussian  war  which  resulted 
in  the  dominance  of  Germany  on  the  continent  of  Europe.  It  continued  with 
rumblings  in  the  Near  East  resulting  in  the  Russo-Turkish  war  and  the  treaty 
of  Berlin,  soon  followed  by  the  opening  of  Africa  and  the  renewal  of  colonial 
rivalry  between  the  powers.  It  drew  to  a conclusion  with  wars  in  Abyssinia, 
South  Africa,  Cuba,  the  Philippines  and  China.  National  military  expendi- 
tures increased  rapidly.®^  The  new  German  Empire  took  the  lead  in  army 
effectives  and  equipment,  while  Great  Britain  became  concerned  at  the 
threat  to  her  sea  supremacy  in  the  increasing  strength  of  the  Russian  and 
French  navies  after  the  creation  of  their  entente  in  1890.  This  concern 
changed  to  alarm  when  the  new, navies  of  Italy,  the  United  States,  Germany 
and  finally  Japan  began  to  assume  formidable  proportions  in  the  late  nine- 
ties.®® 

The  problem  of  limiting  armaments,  primarily  as  a relief  from  taxation 
burdens,  became  widely  discussed.  Consideration  of  the  question  was  pro- 
posed in  the  assembly  of  the  Institute  of  International  Law  in  1887  and  sev- 
eral members  offered  suggestions  though  the  subject  was  decided  to  be  for- 
eign to  the  work  of  the  Institute.®®  Parliamentary  discussion  of  the  subject 
became  more  pronounced  in  the  nineties,®^  and  official  recognition  of  the 
growing  sentiment  was  accorded  in  1898  by  the  Mouravieff  circular  to  the 
more  important  states  of  the  world,  embodying  the  Czar’s  invitation  to  a 
conference  “for  seeking  the  most  effective  means  of  ensuring  to  all  peoples  the 
benefits  of  a real  and  lasting  peace,  and  above  all  of  limiting  the  progressive 
development  of  existing  armaments.”®®  The  conference  met  at  The  Hague  in 
the  summer  of  1899  and  among  other  things  debated  the  Russian  proposals 
for  an  agreement  not  to  increase  existing  naval  and  military  forces  for  periods 

3*  British  and  Foreign  Slate  Papers,  57:  471;  Martens,  N.  R.,  18:  607:  Higgins,  op.  cit.  pp.  8,  18. 

« Martens,  N.  R.  G.,  18:  612;  20:  400;  Higgins,  op.  cit.  p.  14. 

» III  Hague,  1899:  X Hague,  1907:  Higgins,  op.  cit.  p.  358. 

•♦Anderson  and  Hershey,  op.  dt.,  p.  468. 

••  Encydopedia  Britannica,  nth  edition.  “Navy,”  19:  310. 

“ Revue  de  Droit  International,  19:  130,  339,  364,  398.  See  statements  by  Rolin  Jacquemyns, 
Lorimer,  Kamoroviski,  Ibid.,  398,  473.  479,  reprinted  in  Carnegie  Endowment,  pamphlet  No.  22, 
p.  5,  et  seq.  For  other  discussions  during  this  period  see  D.  D.  Field,  Draft  Outlines  of  an  Inter- 
national Code,  Article  328,  2nd  ed.,  1876,  p.  367;  Merignhac,  Traiti  Thiorique  et  Pratique  de  I’ arbi- 
trage international,  Paris,  1895,  Section  549,  p.  512;  Block,  Russian  Councillor  of  State,  Der  Krieg, 
Berlin,  1899,  vol.  VI;  Prince  L.  E.  Obolenski.  The  Novosti,  (St.  Petersburg,  News),  1899.  All 
reprinted  in  Carnegie  Endowment  Pamphlet  No.  22,  pp.  19-32.  See  also  Coulet,  op.  cit.,  pp.  73-79 
and  Wehberg,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  quoting  proposals  of  Raoul  de  la  Grasserie,  1894. 
H.  W.  Blymer,  1892,  pp.  72-74. 

••  Fried,  op.  cit.,  112  et  seq.;  Coulet,  op.  cit.,  p.  78. 

•8  Reports  to  the  Hague  Conferences  of  iSgg  and  igo7,  J.  B.  Scott,  editor,  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
International  Peace.  Division  of  International  Law.  T9t7.  p.  i. 


of  three  and  five  years  respectively.  Because  of  the  opposition  of  Germany 
and  the  lukewarmness  of  most  of  the  other  great  powers,  nothing  was  accom- 
plished in  this  direction  beyond  expression  of  the  opinion  “that  the  restric- 
tion of  military  charges,  which  are  at  present  a heavy  burden  on  the  world, 
is  extremely  desirable  for  the  increase  of  the  material  and  moral  welfare  of 
mankind,”  and  of  the  wish  “that  the  Governments  taking  into  consideration 
the  proposals  made  at  the  Conference,  may  examine  the  possibility  of  an 
agreement  as  to  the  limitation  of  armed  forces.”®®  Chile  and  the  Argentine 
alone  followed  this  advice  by  a five-year  agreement  for  naval  reduction  made 
in  1902  but  not  renewed.^® 

During  this  period  the  colonial  powers  began  to  enforce  restrictions  against 
trading  in  arms  in  their  African  and  Pacific  Colonies^  and  a general  agreement 
for  this  purpose,  applicable  to  Central  Africa,  was  made  at  Brussels  in  1890.“ 
The  United  States  agreed  to  restrict  such  trade  in  Corea  by  special  treaty^ 
and  the  suggestion  was  discussed  for  the  conventional  extension  of  the  prin- 
ciple to  the  Pacific  Islands,^  with  no  results  beyond  such  limited  agreements 
as  those  relating  to  Samoa  (1889-1899)^®  and  Timor  (1893).'*®  In  their 
treaty  with  China  liquidating  the  Boxer  troubles,  however,  the  powers 
including  the  United  States  obliged  China  to  prohibit  the  importation  of 
arms  (1901).^^  This  limitation  had  been  reciprocally  agreed  to  by  China  and 
Corea  in  their  treaty  of  1899^®  and  was  included  in  some  of  the  lease  treaties 
of  the  time,^®  as  also  in  the  Chinese  international  customs  rules  of  1902.®® 

•*  Ibid.,  pp.  172-174;  Proceedings  of  the  First  Peace  Conference  at  the  Hague,  1899,  Carnegie  Endow- 
ment edition,  pp.  303  et  seq.  See  also  Memoirs  of  Bertha  von  Suttner,  1910,  2:  291,  303,  306-311; 
Andrew  D.  White,  Autobiography,  2:  230  et  seq.;  Higgins,  op.  cit,  pp.  73-78;  Auguste  Beernaert, 
Proceedings  of  the  Fourteenth  Interparliamentary  Union,  1906,  pp.  134-133;  Report  of  American 
Delegates  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Carnegie  Endowment  edition  of  Instructions  and  Reports  of 
American  Delegates  to  the  Hague  Conferences;  Holls,  The  Peace  Conference  at  the  Hague-,  Barclay, 
Problems,  pp.  123  et  seq;  Coulet,  op.  cit.,  pp.  83-137. 

British  Parliamentary  Papers,  Miscellaneous  No.  4.  (1903);  See  also  statement  of  Admiral 
Badger,  Hearings  Before  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  House  of  Representatives,  February  4,  1921, 
on  Naval  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  677;  and  Barclay,  Problems,  p.  128,  Collapse  and  Recon- 
struction, Boston,  1919,  p.  181;  and  Coulet,  op.  cit.,  pp.  184-200. 

“ See  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  Index,  1907,  title,  “Arms.”  for  such  regulations  by  Great 
Britain,  France,  Italy.  Portugal  and  Germany. 

“ Brussels  General  Act,  Malloy.  Treaties,  etc.,  p.  1970.  This  was  superseded  in  part  by  the 
Treaty  of  Saint  Germain.  September  10,  1919;  British  Treaty  Series,  No.  12,  (1919);  see  also  A.  H. 
Snow,  The  Question  of  Aborigines,  Washington,  1919,  p.  179. 

" Malloy,  Treaties,  etc.,  p.  338. 

“Note  of  Secretary  of  State  Bayard  to  British  Minister  Sackville-West,  April  ii,  1883,  quoted 
in  Snow,  op.  cit.,  p.  179. 

“ Malloy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  1376.  IS96  (United  States-Germany-Great  Britain). 

British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  83:  394  (Netherlands-Portugal).  See  also  French-British 
agreement  relating  to  the  New  Hebrides,  1906,  Ibid.,  99:  248,  and  French- British-Italian  agreement 
relating  to  Abyssinia,  1906,  Ibid.,  99;  232. 

*’  Powers-China,  1901,  MacMurray,  Treaties  and  Agreements  with  and  Concerning  China,  1894- 
1919,  P.  282. 

China-Corea,  1899,  Ibid.,  p.  21a. 

Germany-China,  1899,  Ibid.,  p.  198.  See  also  customs  regulations  for  Kwangmoon,  Kwantung, 
and  the  Yangtse,  Ibid.,  477,  638,  167. 

‘0  Rule  No.  Ill,  1902,  Ibid.,  p.  450.  See  also  revisions  of  1908  and  1918,  Ibid.,  pp.  737-740,  1484. 


A number  of  treaties  made  during  this  period  provided  for  the  creation  of 
“buffer  zones”  by  the  disarmament  of  boundaries.  Thus  the  boundaries  of 
Cambodge  and  Cochin-China,  China  and  Burma,  Spain  and  Morocco  were 
disarmed  by  treaties  of  1882,  and  1894.^^  By  a treaty  of  1896  Great  Britain 
and  France  agreed  not  to  move  troops  into  a defined  area  of  Siam.®^  In  the 
Boxer  liquidation  treaty  referred  to,  China  agreed  to  raze  the  Taku  forts  near 
Peking  “ and  by  a treaty  of  1904,  Tibet  agreed  to  raze  the  forts  between  the 
British  frontier,  Gyantse  and  Lhasa. 

The  Basin  of  the  Congo  was  neutralized  by  the  Berlin  act  of  1885,“  as 
were  the  Straits  of  Magellan,^  the  Suez,^^  and  the  Panama  Canals,^  by 
treaties  of  1881,  1888  and  1901  respectively.  Little  meaning,  however,  seems 
to  have  been  attached  to  the  term  as  used  in  this  connection.  In  fact,  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  of  1901,  provided  for  a much  less  rigorous  neutral- 
ization of  the  trans-isthmian  canal  than  had  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  of 
1850,  since  it  was  interpreted  to  permit  fortification  of  the  canal  by  the 
United  States.^® 

Progress  was  made  toward  the  codification  of  the  rules  of  war,  especially  in 
the  Hague  Conference  which  completed  the  attempt  of  the  Brussels  con- 
ference of  1874,®^  based  on  Lieber’s  instructions  to  the  United  States  Armies 
of  1863.®^  The  use  of  poison  and  poisoned  weapons,®^  weapons  causing  unneces- 
sary suffering,®^  expanding  bullets,®®  projectiles  for  the  sole  purpose  of  diffus- 
ing asphyxiating  or  deleterious  gases  ®®  and  aircraft  for  dropping  explosives 
were  here  prohibited,  the  last  for  a period  of  five  years  only.®^ 

China-Great  Britain,  with  reference  to  Burma,  1894,  Ibid.,  p.  i;  Barciay,  Problems,  pp.  77,  154. 

52  MacMurray,  China  Treaties,  p.  54;  Barclay,  Problems,  p.  77. 

55  Powers— China,  1901,  Article  8,  Ibid.,  pp.  282,  317. 

55  Great  Britain-Tibet,  1904.  Article  8,  Ibid.,  p.  579. 

55  Berlin  General  Act,  1885,  American  Journal  International  Law,  Supplement,  3:  7,  14.  See  also 
Snow,  op.  cit..  Chapters  10,  ii,  12;  Barclay,  Problems,  p.  75. 

55  Argentine-Chile,  1881,  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  72:  1103;  American  Journal  Interna- 
tional Law,  Supplement  3:  p.  121. 

52  Suez  Canal  Act,  1888,  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  79:  18;  American  Journal  International 
Law,  Supplement;  3:  123. 

58  United  States-Great  Britain,  Malloy,  Treaties,  etc.,  p.  782. 

59  See  P.  C.  Harris,  American  Journal  International  Law,  3:  354;  G.  W.  Davis,  Ibid,  3:  885. 

5“  II  Hague,  1899. 

8'  Higgins,  op.  cit.,  p.  273. 

52  War  Department,  General  Order  100,  April  24,  1863.  Naval  War  College,  International  Law 
Discussions,  1903.  P-  nS- 

55 II  Hague  1899.  Article  23  (a). 

55 II  Hague  1899,  Article  23  (e). 

55  Declaration  III.  Hague  1899,  Higgins,  op  cit.,  p.  493.  The  United  States  did  not  sign  this 
Declaration. 

55  Declaration  II.  Hague  1899,  Higgins,  op.  cit.,  p.  491.  The  United  States  did  not  sign  this 
Declaration. 

52  Declaration  I.  Hague  1899.  Higgins,  op.  cit.,  p.  488. 


3.  1904-1914 


The  third  period,  initiated  by  the  Russo-Japanese  war  and  the  develop- 
ment of  Far  Eastern  rivalries  and  terminated  by  the  Italo-Turkish  and 
Balkan  wars,  evidencing  continued  difficulty  in  the  Near  East,  was  marked 
by  an  increase  in  military  and  naval  expenditures  beyond  the  highest  limits 
set  in  the  previous  period.  The  reduction  of  Russian  military  power  by  the 
Japanese  war  and  the  rise  of  the  German  navy,  led  to  diplomatic  realign- 
ments. The  establishment  of  the  triple  entente,  however,  seemed  to  result  in 
the  need  of  more  strenuous  efforts  by  Great  Britain  and  France  to  keep  pace 
with  the  German  naval  and  military  preparations,  respectively.®* 

The  urgency  of  limiting  expenditures  because  of  their  danger  both  to  peace 
and  financial  stability  was  recognized  by  frequent  debate  in  most  of  the 
parliaments  of  the  world.®®  Attention  was  given  to  the  subject  by  writers  and 
associations.^®  The  Interparliamentary  Union  debated  the  subject  in  1906 
and  again  in  1912.^*  Such  statesmen  as  Premier  Campbell-Bannerman,  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  Presidents  Roosevelt  and  Taft  frequently  referred  to  the  prob- 
lem but  little  progress  was  made.'^^  The  Second  Hague  Peace  Conference  of 
1907,  though  noting  the  acceleration  of  armament  programs,  could  not  get 
beyond  a reiteration  of  the  suggestions  of  the  First  Conference.  Germany  had 
blocked  action  by  refusing  to  attend  the  conference  if  the  subject  were  to  be 
debated.  Great  Britain  was  the  leading  protagonist  of  limitation,  her  dele- 
gates offering  to  exchange  information  annually  on  naval  programs.^®  After 


Anderson  and  Hershey,  op.  cit.,  p.  470. 

Fried,  op  cit.,  2:  166-175,  203-225;  Barclay,  Problems,  124-128;  Coulet,  op.  cit.,  p.  158-170. 

Mention  may  be  made  of  Barclay’s  Proftiemi,  1907;  Butler’s  The  International  Mind,  igi2\ 
Goulet’s  La  Limitation  des  Armements;  Fried’s  Handbuch  der  Friedensbewegung,  1913;  Brailsford’s 
War  0/  Steel  and  Gold,  1914;  Schroeder’s  Discussion  Before  the  International  Law  Association,  1907; 
Scott’s  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences,  1909,  i:  54-62,  654—672,  and  Wehberg’s  Limitation  des 
Armements,  1914,  translated  into  English  by  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  1921, 
which  includes  extracts  from  the  following  as  well  as  others:  Umfrid,  Europa  den  Europdern,  1913, 
p.  86;  Rear  Admiral  Glatzel,  Deutsche  Revue,  November,  1911,  p.  299;  Lujo  Brentano,  Neue  Freie 
Presse,  Vienna,  December  24,  1911;  Jacques  Dumas,  Compte  Rendu,  Seventh  National  French 
Peace  Congress,  1911,  p.  131;  Schiicking,  die  Organisation  der  Welt,  1909,  p.  78;  Vice  Admiral  von 
Ahlefeld,  Deutsche  Revue,  May  1912,  p.  142;  Gaston  Moch,  Vers  la  federation  d’occident  disarmons 
les  Alpes,  1905,  p.  31;  Captain  Perseus,  Berliner  Tageblalt,  February  3,  1914;  Tornet,  La  Limitation 
Conventionelle  des  Armements,  1912,  p.  151;  Dr.  Ludwig  Quidde,  draft  submitted  to  the  Twentieth 
Universal  Peace  Congress  at  the  Hague,  1913.  The  last  is  by  far  the  most  detailed  proposal  ever 
made. 

See  reports  by  Baron  D’Estournelles  de  Constant,  and  discussion  thereon.  Proceedings,  Four- 
teenth Conference,  London,  1906,  pp.  127-159;  Seventeenth  Conference,  Geneva,  1912,  pp. 
85-113;  229-254;  350-351.  See  also,  discussion.  International  Law  Association,  Twenty-fourth 
Session,  Portland,  Me.,  1907,  p.  39- 

Fried,  op.  cit.,  2:  166  et  seq.;  World  Peace  Foundation,  Pamphlet  Series,  No.  i.  Part  II, 
April,  1911;  Barclay,  Problems,  125. 

’’^Reports  to  the  Hague  Conference,  Carnegie  edition,  pp.  892-897,  See  also  Instructions  to  the 
United  States  Delegates  (Carnegie  edition  of  Instructions  and  Reports),  and  to  British  Delegates 
(Higgins,  op.  cit.,  p.  614);  Fried,  op.  cit.  2:  173;  Higgins,  op.  cit.,  pp.  76-78;  Barclay,  International 
Law  and  Practice,  1917,  pp.  31-33;  Haldane,  Before  the  War,  London,  1920,  p.  40,  45;  Coulet, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  171-183. 


I15I 


the  conference,  parliamentary  discussion  of  the  subject  was  almost  con- 
tinuous. Premier  Asquith,  Foreign  Secretary  Grey  and  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty  Churchill  favored  a general  limitation  in  the  British  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  resolutions  urging  a conference  were  passed  in  the  German,  Amer- 
ican, Austro-Hungarian  and  French  legislative  bodies. Though  this  agita- 
tion resulted  in  a definite  invitation  by  President  Taft  to  a conference  on  the 
subject  in  1910,’^  in  Lord  Haldane’s  discussions  with  Germany  in  1912  and 
in  the  offer  of  a naval  holiday  by  Winston  Churchill,  First  Lord  of  the  British 
Admiralty,  in  1913,^^  no  reduction  of  budgets  ensued. 

A method  for  limiting  the  area  of  war  by  a general  guarantee  of  states  which 
voluntarily  declared  themselves  neutral,  was  discussed  in  the  Interparlia- 
mentary Union  in  1913.’®  This,  like  the  proposal  to  neutralize  Spitzbergen  in 
1912,^®  came  to  nothing.  The  permanent  neutrality  of  Honduras  was,  how- 
ever, recognized  in  the  Central  American  Peace  Treaty  of  1907,®“  as  was  the 
non-fortifiability  of  the  Island  of  Sakhalien  in  the  Russo-Japanese  peace 
treaty  of  1905.®^  During  the  following  year,  acting  upon  a tacit  agreement, 
Italy  and  France  began  to  reduce  the  armament  of  their  common  frontier.  In 
March,  1913,  Russia  and  Austria  agreed  to  reduce  the  strength  of  companies 
on  the  Galician  frontier  and  in  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  (1913)  Bulgaria 
agreed  to  raze  fortresses  on  the  Roumanian  frontier  and  to  reduce  her  army  to 
peace  strength.*^ 

The  treaties  of  1905,  sanctioning  the  separation  of  Sweden  and  Norway, 
provided  for  the  neutralization  and  disarmament  of  their  common  boundary.*^ 
Suggestions  for  the  neutralization  of  the  Baltic,  reviving  attempts  of  two  cen- 
turies earlier,  were  made  in  Germany  in  1905.*^  The  neutralization  of  certain 

” Fried,  op.  cit.,  2:  203  et  seq.  For  German  resolution,  March  31,  1911,  United  States,  November 
16,  1910,  Austro-Hungarian,  March  21,  1911,  French,  February  23,  1911,  see  ibid,  pp.  21s,  216, 
219,  220,  and  Interparliamentary  Union,  Documents  Nos.  3-6,  1911. 

’5  Joint  Resolutions,  June  25,  1910,  and  annual  message  of  President  Taft,  December  6,  1910. 
See  debate  on  the  resolution,  June  20,  1910,  and  House  Report,  No,  1440,  Sixty-first  Congress, 
Second  Session.  These  documents  and  record  of  debate  in  various  European  Parliaments  on  the 
resolution  are  printed  in  Interparliamentary  Union.  Document  No.  6,  1911. 

76  Viscount  Haldane,  Before  the  War,  1920,  pp.  52-72. 

77  Fried,  op  cit.,  2:203;  Wehberg,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  pp.  35-39;  on  proposal  of 
President  Wilson,  Colonel  House  and  Ambassador  Page  to  forward  this  plan,  see  Burton  Hendrick's 
Life  and  Letters  of  Waller  Hines  Page,  of  which  extracts  appeared  in  the  World’s  Work,  October, 
1921,  62:  560. 

76  Interparliamentary  Union,  Eighteenth  Session,  The  Hague,  September  3,  1913,  Proceedings, 
p.  355;  Annuaire,  1914,  pp.  39-50.  A proposal  to  neutralize  all  oceanic  straits  and  canals  was  dis- 
cussed at  the  Sixteenth  Conference,  Brussels,  1910,  Annuaire,  1914,  pp.  36-39;  Barclay,  Problems, 
pp.  74.  180. 

76  L.  H.  Gray,  Spitzbergen  and  Bear  Island,  Washington,  1919.  Proposals  to  neutralize  the  Philip- 
pine Islands  have  been  made  from  time  to  time.  See  Winslow,  Neutralization,  American  Journal 
International  Law,  2:  366-386  and  Vestal,  the  Maintenance  of  Peace,  1921,  pp.  410-422. 

6“  Malloy,  Treaties,  etc.,  p.  2393. 

6'  Article  9.  MacMurray,  China  Treaties,  p.  524. 

82  Wehberg,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  pp.  29,  34,  66. 

66  Martens,  N.  R,  G.,  II,  p.  703;  American  Journal  International  Law,  Supplement  i:  171;  Bar- 
clay, Problems,  p.  77. 

6*  Barclay,  Problems,  p.  73  and  supra  note  25. 


ocean  routes*®  and  the  localization  of  the  area  of  maritime  war  by  prohibiting 
visit  and  search  in  distant  waters*®  were  among  suggestions  made  upon  the 
approach  of  the  Second  Hague  Conference. 

The  policy  of  restricting  arms  trade  in  turbulent  and  uncivilized  regions  was 
carried  on  by  provisions  in  the  Algeciras  Convention  of  1906,  dealing  with 
Morocco,*^  and  by  resolutions  of  the  American  Congress  in  1912,**  founded  on 
one  of  1898,®*  and  suggested  by  the  Mexican  situation,  which  authorized  the 
President  to  proclaim  an  arms  embargo  against  American  countries  in  a state 
of  domestic  violence.  The  Hague  Convention  of  1907,  expressly  stated  that 
neutral  governments  were  not  bound  to  prohibit  the  shipment  of  arms  or 
munitions  of  war,  other  than  war  vessels,  to  belligerents,  though  they  must 
themselves  abstain  from  such  trade.*® 

The  Hague  Conference  of  1907  revised  the  rules  of  warfare  adopted  in 
1899,*^  and  extended  the  prohibition  against  bombing  from  aircraft  to  the 
close  of  the  third  peace  conference  though  this  declaration  was  not  generally 
ratified.**  The  Conference  also  attempted  to  regulate  automatic  submarine 
contact  mines,**  and  auxiliary  naval  vessels.  The  convention  dealing  with  the 
latter  subject  specified  the  conditions  which  a merchant  vessel  converted  into 
a war  vessel  must  observe  to  avoid  the  penalty  attached  to  privateering.*^ 


4.  I914-I92I 

The  final  period,  beginning  with  the  World  War,  has  seen  the  world  reduced 
to  a state  of  economic  exhaustion  resembling  that  of  a hundred  years  ago. 
There  has  developed  a considerable  literature  on  the  subject  of  limiting  arma- 
ments and  private  organizations  devoted  to  international  questions  have 


*5  Ibid.,  p.  81. 

“Ibid.,  pp.  71,  74.  Precedents  for  this  existed  in  the  agreement  (not,  however,  sanctioned  by  the 
French  Government),  of  a French  and  a German  commander  at  Nagasaki,  to  regard  Far  Eastern 
waters  as  neutral  in  1870;  in  British  orders  of  1900,  forbidding  visit  and  search  far  from  the  seat 
of  war,  and  in  British  proposals  to  this  end  during  the  Russo-Japanese  war. 

Algerciras  General  Act,  1906,  Malloy,  Treaties,  etc.,  p.  2162. 

United  States  Joint  Resolution,  March  14,  1912.  See  proclamation  under  this  resolution  pro- 
hibiting arms  trade  to  Mexico,  October  19,  191S,  World  Peace  Foundation,  Pamphlet  Series  VI, 
No.  2,  p.  89. 

*3  United  States  Joint  Resolution,  April  22,  1898.  See  Proclamation  under  this  resolution  pro- 
hibiting arras  trade  to  San  Domingo,  October  14,  1905.  British  and  Foreign  Papers,  loi:  638. 

•oV  Hague,  1907,  Article  7;  XIII  Hague,  1907,  Articles  6-8;  Higgins,  op.  cit.,  pp.  291,  464. 
Germany  protested  against  the  failure  of  Great  Britain  to  prohibit  arms  trade  to  France  during  the 
war  of  1870  but  the  British  Government  asserted,  on  the  basis  of  precedents  of  the  Crimean  war 
and  others,  that  neutrals  were  under  no  such  obligation.  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  61:  714, 
759-766.  870. 

*1  IV  Hague  1907,  Higgins,  pp.  208-272. 

“ XIV  Hague,  1907.  Higgins,  op.  cit.,  pp.  485-491. 

“VIII  Hague  1907,  Higgins,  op.  cit.,  pp.  321-34S. 

“VII  Hague  1907,  Higgins,  op.  cit.,  pp.  308-321. 


[17] 


given  it  study. The  official  statement  of  war  aims  by  the  United  States 
accepted  by  the  Allies  and  by  the  enemy  powers,  included  a demand  for 
“adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that  national  armaments  will  be 
reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  domestic  safety.”^®  The  armis- 
tices and  treaties®*  ending  hostilities  provided  for  the  disarmament  of  Ger- 
many, Austria,  Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  to  the  minimum  necessary 
for  domestic  police,  “in  order  to  render  possible  the  initiation  of  a general 
limitation  of  the  armaments  of  all  nations.”  This  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles has  been  accepted  by  the  United  States  in  the  special  treaty  with  Ger- 
many signed  August  25,  1921.®®  The  League  of  Nations,  established  by  the 
treaties,  and  now  including  all  recognized  states  except  the  United  States, 
Germany,  Hungary,  Turkey,  Russia,  Mexico,  San  Domingo,  Abyssinia, 
Afghanistan,  Monaco,  and  Lichtenstein^®®  provides  for  the  formulation  of  a 
plan  of  armament  reduction  by  the  League  Council  to  be  submitted  to  the 
governments  and,  if  accepted,  not  to  be  exceeded  for  ten  years  without  the 
concurrence  of  the  Council.  The  Members  of  the  League  recognize  “that  the 
maintenance  of  peace  requires  the  reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the 

55  Contributions  may  be  mentioned  by  Lord  Bryce  and  Tomraasso  Tittoni,  at  the  Williamstown 
Institute  of  Politics,  1921:  Colonel  Davies  at  the  meetings  of  the  Grotius  Society  and  the  Interna- 
tional Law  Association,  1919.  1920;  Herr  Erzberger  (T/je  League  of  Nations,  1919);  S.  C.  Vestal 
(The  Maintenance  of  Peace,  1920);  J.  L.  Garvin  (The  Economic  Foundations  of  Peace,  1919);  General 
Tasker  H.  Bliss  (What  Really  Happened  at  Paris,  1921);  Major  Sherman  Miles  (Saturday  Evening 
Post,  May  28,  1921);  Sir  Frederick  Pollock  (The  League  of  Nations,  1920);  Hans  Wehberg  (Die 
internationale  Beschrdnkung  der  Rilstungen,  1919);  Sir  Thomas  Barclay  (International  Law  and 
Practice,  1917,  Collapse  and  Reconstruction,  1919);  W.  H.  Taft  (The  Covenanter,  1919). 

® Point  No.  4,  of  the  14  points  in  address  of  President  Wilson,  January  8,  1918,  accepted  by 
allied  and  German  governments  as  a basis  of  peace  in  exchange  of  notes,  November  s,  1918,  Naval 
War  College,  International  Law  Documents,  1911,  p.  211;  International  Conciliation,  No.  123.  For 
statements  of  allied  and  enemy  statesmen  accepting  the  4th  point,  see  War  Aims  of  Belligerents 
A League  of  Nations,  vol.  i.  No.  3.  February,  1918. 

For  Armistices  with  Germany,  Austria,  Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  see  N.  W.  C.,  Inter- 
national Law  Documents,  1918;  International  Conciliation,  No.  133. 

For  Treaties  of  Versailles,  (Germany,  June  28,  1919),  Saint  Germain  (Austria,  September  10, 
1919),  Neuilly  (Bulgaria,  November  27,  1919),  Trianon  (Hungary,  June  4,  1920),  Sevres  (Turkey, 
August  10,  1920),  see  American  Journal  International  Law,  Supplement  1919-1921.  The  Treaty 
of  Versailles  with  index  is  published  in  N.  W.  C.,  International  Law  Documents,  1919;  without 
index  in  International  Conciliation,  No.  142.  With  French  and  English  texts  in  parallel  columns  it 
has  been  published  by  the  British  and  French  governments  and  as  Senate  Document,  No.  85, 
Sixty-sixth  Congress,  First  Session. 

*•  Preamble  to  Part  V of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  corresponding  articles  of  treaties  of  Saint 
Germain,  Neuilly,  Trianon  and  Sevres.  See  General  Bliss,  What  Really  Happened  at  Paris,  House  and 
Seymour  editors,  and  Hearings  of  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  House  of  Representatives,  Disarma- 
ments, January  12,  1921,  p.  552.  Article  i,  of  the  League  of  Nations  Covenant  provides  that  before 
admittance  to  the  League  states  not  members  by  the  original  Covenant  “shall  accept  such  regula- 
tions as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  League  in  regard  to  its  military,  naval  and  air  forces  and  arma- 
ments.” In  the  treaty  of  August  25,  1921,  Article  ii,  “The  rights  and  advantages  stipulated  in  that 
treaty  (Versailles)  for  the  benefit  of  the  United  States  which  it  is  intended  the  United  States  shall 
have  and  enjoy  are  those  defined  in  * * * part  five  * * * The  United  States  in  availing  itself 

of  the  rights  and  advantages  stipulated  in  the  provisions  of  that  treaty  mentioned  in  this  paragraph 
will  do  so  in  a manner  consistent  with  the  rights  accorded  to  Germany  under  such  provisions.” 

100  Q.  Wright,  Minnesota  Law  Review,  5:  447;  The  League  of  Nations,  4:  206.  The  United  States 
was  invited  to  participate  in  the  deliberations  of  the  Disarmament  Commission  by  the  Council  of 
the  League  in  December,  1920,  but  declined  (H.  of  R.  Hearings  on  Disarmament,  p.  536). 

[18] 


lowest  point  consistent  with  national  safety  and  the  enforcement  by  common 
action  of  international  obligations,”  and  they  “agree  that  the  manufacture  by 
private  enterprise  of  munitions  and  implements  of  war  is  open  to  grave  objec- 
tion.”!®^  As  a sanction  for  these  provisions,  the  members  of  the  League  under- 
take “to  interchange  full  and  frank  information  as  to  the  scale  of  their  arma- 
ments, their  military,  naval  and  air  programs  and  the  conditions  of  such  of 
their  industries  as  are  adaptable  to  war-like  purposes.”  A permanent  com- 
mission has  been  established  “to  advise  the  Council  on  the  execution”  of  these 
provisions  and  “on  military,  naval  and  air  questions  generally.”  During  the 
Peace  Conference  the  French  delegates  sought  to  strengthen  this  commission 
by  giving  it  powers  of  inspection,  if  not  indeed  constituting  it  a general  staff 
for  directing  the  military  forces  of  the  League  Members  as  an  international 
police  force.  The  American  and  British  delegates  felt  that  this  would  involve 
an  impairment  of  national  sovereignty  and  the  proposal  was  for  the  time 
abandoned.!®^ 

The  Allied  Supreme  Council  on  March  8,  1920,  declared  that  “armies 
should  everywhere  be  reduced  to  a peace  footing,  that  armaments  should  be 
limited  to  the  lowest  possible  figure  compatible  with  national  security  and  the 
League  of  Nations  should  be  invited  to  consider  as  soon  as  possible  proposals 
to  this  end.”*®®  Several  European  Parliaments  have  passed  resolutions  to  the 
same  effect.*®^  The  International  Financial  Conference  which  sat  under  a call 
of  the  League  of  Nations  in  September,  1920,  “most  earnestly”  recommended 
conference  by  the  League  organs,  “with  a view  to  securing  a general  and  agreed 
reduction  of  the  crushing  burden  which  in  their  existing  scale,  armaments  still 
impose  on  the  impoverished  peoples  of  the  world.”*®®  The  Disarmament  Com- 
mission, the  Council  and  the  Assembly  of  the  League  have  considered  the 
question  but  have  accomplished  little  beyond  a recommendation,  now 
accepted  by  fifteen  powers  (in  some  cases  with  reservations),  excluding,  how- 
ever, France,  Poland  and  Japan,  that  military  budgets  be  not  increased  for 
two  years.*®®  In  its  meeting  of  December,  1921,  the  Assembly  urged  the  rapid 

League  of  Nations  Covenant,  Article  VIII. 

‘“Pollock,  The  League  of  Nations,  1920,  p.  126.  Tardieu,  The  Truth  About  the  Treaty,  1921, 
p.  428.  The  League  of  Nations,  4:34s,  August  1921.  The  connection  between  the  limitation  of 
armaments  and  the  establishment  of  an  international  police  force  is  emphasized  in  a collection  of 
extracts  from  the  writings  of  statesmen  and  jurists,  entitled,  “War  Obviated  by  an  International 
Police,"  edited  by  C.  Van  Vollenhoven,  The  Hague,  191S. 

The  League  of  Nations,  3:  221  (1920).  See  also  Kluymer,  Documents  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
Leiden,  1921,  p.  25s. 

See  Resolution  of  French  Chamber  of  Deputies,  October  3,  1919,  and  of  Dutch  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  Ibid.,  3:  29.  A resolution  favoring  limitation  of  armaments  introduced  in  the  Japanese 
lower  house  by  Mr.  Ozaki  on  February  10,  1921,  was  defeated  by  a vote  of  285  to  38.  Similar  reso- 
lutions were  passed  by  the  Nineteenth  Conference  of  the  Interparliamentary  Union  (August  17-19, 
1921)  and  the  Twenty-first  Universal  Peace  Congress  at  Luxemburg  (August  10-13,  1921).  See 
Advocate  of  Peace,  83:  350,  353,  October,  1921. 

105  Ibid.,  3:  221. 

106  First  Assembly  of  League  of  Nations,  1920,  Document  No.  238,  Resolution  No.  16;  see  also 
League  of  Nations  Official  Journal,  vol.  2,  No.  4,  p.  317.  and  Second  Assembly  Document.  No.  13, 
giving  replies  received  to  August  22,  1921.  The  report  of  the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission  on 
Armaments,  September  is,  1921,  Second  Assembly  Document,  No.  81,  analyzes  these  replies. 


development  by  the  Council  of  plans  for  general  disarmament/®^  and  in  its 
meeting  of  October  i,  1921,  the  Second  Assembly  resolved  that  “proposals  on 
general  lines  for  the  reduction  of  national  armaments”  be  presented  to  the 
Council  in  definite  terms  “if  possible  before  the  Assembly  of  next  year.”^®* 
The  reports  of  the  temporary  mixed  commission  on  armaments  and  of  the 
third  committee  of  the  Second  Assembly  published  in  September,  1921 
(2nd  Assembly  documents  Nos.  81,  158)  summarize  the  armament  conditions 
and  make  proposals  for  limitation. 

The  members  of  the  League  by  the  Covenant  have  agreed  “to  entrust  the 
League  with  the  general  supervision  of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition 
with  the  countries  in  which  the  control  of  this  traffic  is  necessary  in  the  com- 
mon interest,”^®®  and  in  pursuance  of  this  article,  a treaty  was  signed  at  Saint 
Germain  in  1919  generalizing  the  provisions  of  the  Brussels  and  Algeciras 
Conventions  with  respect  to  arms  traffic  in  uncivilized  regions  and  prohibiting 
all  export  of  arms  for  exclusively  military  use,  except  under  license  to  govern- 
ments signatory  to  the  treaty .^^®  A full  execution  of  this  treaty,  which  has 
been  signed  but  not  ratified  by  the  United  States,  was  particularly  urged  by  the 
First  and  Second  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations.*^^  The  Covenant  also 
provides  that  states  holding  Class  B mandates  must  “guarantee  the  prohibi- 
tion of  abuses  such  as  the  arms  traffic  and  the  prevention  of  the  establishment 
of  fortifications  or  military  and  naval  bases  and  of  military  training  of  the 
natives  for  other  than  police  purposes  and  the  defence  of  the  territory,”  and 
that  the  interests  of  the  natives  in  class  C mandates  must  be  similarly  safe- 
guarded.^^® The  mandates  so  far  published  have  incorporated  these  provi- 
sions.i^®  Indiscriminate  arms  trade  was  also  discountenanced  in  the  sugges- 
tion of  the  President  of  the  United  States  at  the  Second  Pan  American  Scien- 
tific Congress  in  1916  that  American  countries  agree  to  prohibit  arms  ship- 
ments for  the  use  of  revolutionists  in  the  new  world.^^^  Exchanges  of  notes  by 
the  United  States  while  neutral  with  Germany  and  Austria  affirmed  the  pro- 


First  Assembly.  Verbatim  record  of  Plenary  Meeting,  Nos.  22,  23;  Proc€s-verbaux  of  the 
Sixth  Committee,  Nos.  2,  4,  14,  20;  Report  of  the  Committee^(Document  199)  and  Resolution  No. 
16  (Document  238). 

Procds-verbaux  of  Third  Committee;  Provisional  Verbatim  Record,  Twenty-seventh  Plenary 
Meeting,  p.  14;  Report  of  Third  Committee  (Document  158)  and  Resolutions  on  Reduction  of 
Armaments  (League  of  Nations  Official  Journal,  Special  Supplement  No.  6,  p.  23). 

'"•League  of  Nations  Covenant,  Article  23  (d). 

no  Great  Britain,  Treaty  Series,  No.  12  (1919);  International  Conciliation,  No.  164. 

Supra,  notes  107,  108.  See  also  League  of  Nations.  Council,  1920,  Document  No.  72.  printed 
also  in  League  of  Nations,  Official  Journal,  November-December,  1920. 

League  of  Nations  Covenant,  Article  22,  paragraphs  s,  6. 

See  Mandates  for  CJerman  Southwest  Africa  and  Pacific  Islands,  League  of  Nations,  Official 
Journal,  January-February,  1921.  Draft  Mandates  for  East  Africa,  Togoland,  Cameroons,  Meso- 
potamia. Palestine,  British  Parliamentary  Papers,  Nos.  3,  14,  16.  (1921). 

The  New  Pan-Americanism,  World  Peace  Foundation,  Pamphlet  Series.  1916.  VI,  No.  2. 
pp.  108,  no. 

I 20] 


visions  of  the  Hague  Conventions  permitting  arms  trade  by  neutral  indi- 
viduals.^^® 

Many  suggestions  have  been  made  for  a revision  of  the  laws  of  war  and 
particularly  for  the  prohibition  of  certain  instruments  such  as  poison  gases, 
submarines,  and  bombing  aircraft.  The  permanent  armament  commission 
and  the  Council  of  the  League  have  condemned  the  use  of  poison  gases  in 
warfare.^^® 

Although  the  United  States  failed  to  ratify  the  treaties  of  peace.  Congress 
had  manifested  an  interest  in  limiting  armaments  by  accepting  the  Hensley 
amendment  to  the  unusually  large  naval  appropriation  act  of  1916,  stating 
the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  be  one  of  pacific  settlement  of  international 
disputes  and  authorizing  the  President  to  call  a conference  for  discussion  of  a 
general  limitation  of  armaments.^^^  President  Wilson  endorsed  this  policy  in 
his  statement  of  war  aims  and  attempted  to  achieve  it  through  the  League  of 
Nations.^^®  After  the  failure  of  the  Senate  to  sanction  the  treaties,”®  renewed 
discussion  in  1921  resulted  in  a series  of  hearings  before  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives Committee  on  Naval  Affairs  which  revealed  a unanimous  senti- 
ment among  such  men  as  General  Pershing,  General  Bliss,  former  Ambas- 
sador White,  Admiral  Badger  and  Admiral  Sims  in  favor  of  an  international 
conference  on  the  subject.^®®  A resolution  introduced  by  Senator  Borah  sug- 
gesting the  calling  of  a conference  on  limiting  naval  armaments  was  dis- 
cussed in  the  Senate;^”  on  July  10,  1921,  President  Harding  announced  his 
intention  to  call  such  a conference,  and  on  July  12  the  Naval  Appropriation 


See  N.  W.  C.,  International  Law  Documents,  1906,  p.  76;  1907,  p.  115;  1912,  pp.  131-134; 
Austria-Hungary  notes,  January  29,  191S,  September  24,  191S,  American  Journal  International 
Law,  Special  Supplement,  9:  146;  10:  354;  Germany  notes  December  13,  1914,  February  16,  191S, 
April  4,  1915,  Ibid,  9:  90,  126,  216;  United  States  notes  to  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  Aug- 
ust 12,  191S,  April  21,  1915,  December  24,  1914,  March  is,  1917.  Ibid.,  9:  166-171,  128-129,  217; 
Stale  Department  White  Book,  No.  4.  p.  350. 

Report  of  Permanent  Armaments  Commission  and  Resolution  of  Council  based  thereon,  at 
Tenth  Meeting,  October  28,  1920,  League  of  Nations.  Official  Journal,  November-December,  1920, 
p.  39;  League  of  Nations,  3:265.  See  also  Wright,  Minnesota  Law  Reoiew,  5:  S2i. 

Act  August  29,  1916.  See  A League  of  Nations,  October,  1917.  vol.  i.  No.  i,  p.  40.  Statement 
of  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Daniels,  Hearings  of  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  House  of  Representa- 
tives. January  ii,  1921,  on  Disarmament,  p.  334- 

Supra  notes  96,  98.  See  also  statement  by  President  Wilson,  September  13,  1919,  quoted  in 
Secretary  Daniels’  remarks  cited,  supra  note.  117. 

115  The  Senate  proposed  to  reserve  “the  right  to  increase  such  armaments  without  the  consent  of 
the  Council  whenever  the  United  States  is  threatened  with  invasion  or  engaged  in  war,”  had  it 
accepted  the  Covenant.  (Reservation  No.  10,  A League  of  Nations,  vol.  3,  pp.  171,  185.) 

120  Hearing  of  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  Sixty-sixth  Congress.  Third  Session,  “Disarmament." 
and  “Naval  Policy  of  the  United  States.”  See  also  Hearings  Before  House  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs  and  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  Sixty-sixth  Congress,  Third  Session,  January 
1921. 

*21  Sixty-seventh  Congress,  First  Session,  S.  J.  Res.  18.  introduced  April  14.  1921.  See  also 
S.  J.  Res.  81,  introduced  July  7.  1921,  by  Mr.  Pomerene. 


[21] 


Act  authorizing  a conference  was  signed.^^'^  On  August  1 1,  1921,  formal  invita- 
tions were  extended  to  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan  to  attend  a 
conference  at  Washington  on  November  ii,  1921,  to  discuss  the  limitation  of 
armaments  and  problems  of  the  Far  East.  China  was  at  the  same  time  in- 
vited to  participate  in  discussion  of  the  latter  question,  as  were  Belgium,  the 
Netherlands  and  Portugal  on  October  4,  1921. 

At  the  first  plenary  meeting  of  the  Conference,  November  12,  1921,  Secre- 
tary of  State  Hughes  proposed  a detailed  plan  for  limiting  naval  armament 
based  on  four  general  principles: 

“(a)  The  elimination  of  all  capital  ship  building  programs,  either  actual  or 
projected. 

“(b)  Further  reduction  through  the  scrapping  of  certain  of  the  older  ships. 

“(c)  That  regard  should  be  had  to  the  existing  naval  strength  of  the  conferring 
powers. 

“(d)  The  use  of  capital  ship  tonnage  as  the  measurement  of  strength  for  navies 
and  a proportionate  allowance  of  auxiliary  combatant  craft  prescribed.” 

The  plan  proposed  a reduction  of  the  aggregate  existing  and  proposed 
capital  ship  tonnage  of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Japan  by  about 
60  per  cent,  a cessation  of  all  naval  building  for  ten  years,  after  which  replace- 
ment tonnage  could  be  built  maintaining  a ratio  of  5,  5,  3 as  between  the 
three  powers. 

III. 

OUTLINE  FOR  STUDY 

A.  POLITICAL,  SOCIAL,  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 
I.  Need  of  limiting  armaments. 

Limitation  of  armaments  has  been  urged  (a)  as  a means  of  government 
economy  (b)  as  a means  of  decreasing  the  probability  of  war  (c)  as  a means  of 
ameliorating  the  hardships  of  war.  It  should  be  noticed  that  measures  of 
limitation  tending  toward  one  of  these  ends,  may  not  necessarily  tend  toward, 
and  may  even  tend  away  from  the  others.  Consequently  the  economic, 
political  and  humanitarian  purposes  should  be  considered  separately. 

Readings  : 

Allen,  Arthur  W.,  The  Drain  of  Armaments,  World  Peace  Foundation,  Pamphlet 

Series,  June  1913. 

■22  Section  9,  “Authorized  and  requested”  the  President  “to  invite  the  Governments  of  Great 
Britain  and  Japan  to  send  representatives  to  a conference,  which  shall  be  charged  with  the  duty  of 
promptly  entering  into  an  understanding  or  agreement  by  which  the  naval  expenditures  and  build- 
ing programs  of  each  of  said  Governments,  to  wit,  the  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  shall 
be  substantially  reduced  annually  during  the  next  five  years  to  such  an  extent  and  upon  such  terms 
as  may  be  agreed  upon,  which  understanding  or  agreement  is  to  be  reported  to  the  respective  Gov- 
ernments for  approval."  This  is  the  wording  of  the  Borah  resolution,  supra  note  121. 


American  Academy  of  Social  and  Political  Science,  Annals,  96:  45-67,  July,  1921. 
Articles  by  Senator  T.  J.  Walsh,  Representatives  F.  W.  Mondell,  F.  C.  Hicks, 
J.  J.  Rogers,  and  Major  General  Bullard. 

Borah,  Senator  William  E.,  addresses  in  the  Senate,  January  27,  1921  (Suspen- 
sion of  Naval  Building),  February  17,  1921  (Waste  of  Public  Funds),  March  i, 
1921  (Naval  Armaments),  Congressional  Record,  60:2165-2169,  4168-4170. 
Cobb,  Frank  I.,  The  Need  of  Disarmament  to  Relieve  Economic  Exhaustion,  Atlantic 
Monthly,  September,  1921. 

Cobden,  Richard,  Three  Panics,  1862,  reprinted  in  Political  Writings,  London, 
1903,  1 : 537-704- 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  Speech  in  House  of  Commons,  March  13,  1911,  printed  in 
World  Peace  Foundation,  Pamphlet  Series,  April,  1911. 

Harding,  President  Warren  G.,  Invitation  to  Conference  on  Limitation  of  Arma- 
ment, August  II,  1921.  International  Conciliation  No.  169. 

Hirst,  F.  W.,  Taxation  and  Armaments,  International  Conciliation,  No.  36,  No- 
vember, 1910. 

Irwin,  Will,  The  Next  War,  New  York,  1921. 

League  of  Nations,  Second  Assembly,  September,  1921,  Verbatim  Record  of  27th 
Plenary  meeting,  especially  addresses  of  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  representing  South 
Africa,  Bruce  of  Australia,  Noblemaire  of  France  and  Fisher  of  Great  Britain. 
Massachusetts  Commission  on  the  Cost  of  Living,  Report  1910  on  the  Waste  of 
Militarism,  reprinted  in  World  Peace  Foundation,  Pamphlet  Series,  October,  191 2. 
Nicholas  II,  Czar  of  Russia,  call  to  First  Hague  Conference,  August  12,  1898 
(Mouravieff  circular).  Reports  of  the  Hague  Conference,  Carnegie  Endowment 
Edition,  pp.  1-2. 

Root,  E.,  Instructions  to  American  Delegates  to  the  Second  Hague  Conference, 
United  States  Foreign  Relations,  1907,  pt.  2,  p.  1131. 

Scott,  J.  B.,  edition  of  Instructions  to  the  American  Delegates  to  the  Hague 
Peace  Conferences  and  Official  Reports,  p.  74. 

Staggering  Burden  of  Armament,  A League  of  Nations  (publication  of  World 
Peace  Foundation),  vol.  4,  Nos.  2 and  4. 

Taft,  William  Howard,  The  Covenanter,  Nos.  ii,  12,  1919,  reprinted  in  the  League 
of  Nations,  vol.  2,  No.  3,  June,  1919. 

United  States  House  of  Representatives: 

Hearings  of  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  January  14,  15,  1921  “Disarmament.” 
Hearings  of  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  January  ii,  1921,  “World  Dis- 
armament.” 

Hearings  of  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  January-February,  1921,  “Disarma- 
ment,” especially  statements  of  Generals  Pershing  and  Bliss,  and  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  Daniels. 

World  Friendship,  Disarmament  Number,  vol.  i.  No.  6,  March,  1921,  printing 
opinions  of  prominent  military  and  naval  men,  statesmen,  educators,  clergy- 
men, etc. 

Questions  : 

I.  What  was  the  opinion  of  the  International  Financial  conference  of  1920 
on  the  subject  of  armaments?  (See  League  of  Nations,  vol.  3,  No.  5,  Octo- 
ber 1920). 


2.  a)  How  much  would  the  average  American  citizen  save  per  year  if  naval 
budgets  were  reduced  by  half;  b)  the  average  British  subject;  c)  the  average 
Japanese? 

3.  What  is  the  average  proportion  of  public  revenues  used  for  direct  mili- 
tary purposes  (army,  navy  and  air  service)  in  the  leading  countries;  for 
indirect  military  purposes  (pensions,  interest  on  the  public  debt)?  Have  these 
ratios  increased  since  1880? 

4.  Would  a saving  of  taxes  result  from  the  abolition  of  a)  poison  gases,  b) 
submarines,  c)  conscription,  d)  from  the  discontinuance  of  capital  ship  build- 
ing (battleships  and  battle  cruisers),  e)  from  the  neutralization  of  water 
routes,  f)  from  the  prohibition  of  private  arms  manufacture? 

5.  Is  it  true  that  preparation  for  war  is  a good  way  to  assure  peace? 

6.  How  would  you  distinguish  armaments  for  offense  from  armaments  for 
defense? 

7.  Is  it  possible  to  distinguish  armaments  for  internal  police  from  arma- 
ments for  defense  against  external  aggression?  Would  you  regard  this  dis- 
tinction as  a significant  one  with  reference  to  the  problem  of  limiting  arma- 
ments? (See  remarks  of  Lord  Robert  Cecil  in  third  committee  of  Second 
Assembly  of  League  of  Nations.) 

8.  Can  you  give  any  examples  of  wars  caused  by  competitive  armament 
building? 

9.  Do  you  consider  armament  limitation  for  the  purpose  of  preserving 
peace,  putting  the  cart  before  the  horse? 

10.  Is  the  rule,  cited  by  Senator  Borah,  that  litigants  must  stack  their  guns 
outside  the  court-room,  applicable  to  international  relations? 

1 1 . Would  the  probability  of  war  be  decreased  a)  by  the  abolition  of  poison 
gas,  submarines,  and  other  instruments  of  warfare,  b)  by  the  abolition  of 
conscription,  c)  by  the  abolition  of  private  arms  manufacture,  d)  by  the 
neutralization  of  islands  suitable  for  naval  bases,  e)  by  the  disarmament  of 
land  frontiers? 

12.  Does  the  piling  up  of  armaments  in  time  of  peace  render  war  less 
humane  in  case  it  does  occur? 

13.  Would  war  be  rendered  more  humane  by  prohibiting  the  use  of  a) 
poison  gas,  b)  submarines,  c)  conscription,  d)  semi-civilized  colonial  troops? 

14.  Is  the  demand  for  armament  limitation  primarily  economic,  political 
or  humanitarian? 

15.  Outline  the  form  of  armament  limitation  which  in  your  opinion 
would  a)  save  the  most  taxes,  b)  best  assure  the  preservation  of  peace,  c) 
ameliorate  the  hardships  of  war  to  the  greatest  possible  extent.  Can  you 
think  of  a single  principle  of  limitation  which  would  effect  all  of  these  ends? 

2.  Relation  of  Armaments  to  Foreign  Policy. 

Armaments  are  always  said  to  be  built  for  defense.  Defense  may  be  classi- 
fied as  a)  defense  of  home  territory  from  invasion,  b)  defense  of  commerce  and 


[24] 


overseas  possessions,  c)  defense  of  foreign  policies.  Military  strategy  may 
require  invasion  of  the  enemy  territory  where  the  object  is  defense  of  your 
own.  Furthermore,  the  defense  of  an  aggressive  policy,  such  for  instance  as 
the  extreme  Pan-German  policy,  would  seem  wholly  offensive.  Thus  the  dis- 
tinction between  armaments  for  defense  and  offense  proves  difficult  to  main- 
tain. The  terms  offensive  and  defensive  can  be  more  properly  applied  to  the 
policies  for  which  armaments  are  used  than  to  the  armaments  themselves. 
The  more  offensive  a policy  becomes,  the  less  it  can  be  maintained  by  recourse 
to  diplomacy,  arbitration  and  conciliation;  the  more  it  will  require  arma- 
ments for  support. 

The  character  of  armaments  required  for  the  defense  of  home  territory 
depends  on  geographical  conditions.  This  problem  is  more  pressing  in  a 
country,  like  France,  surrounded  by  possible  invaders,  than  in  a country  like 
the  United  States  whose  neighbors  are  relatively  weak.  For  adequate  defense 
against  overseas  invasion  a navy  need  not  be  nearly  so  powerful  as  that  of  the 
prospective  invader,  because  of  the  advantage  of  proximity  to  bases. 

The  defense  of  commerce  and  overseas  possessions  is  a naval  rather  than  a 
military  problem.  This  interest  is  less  vital  in  a self  sustaining  country  like 
the  United  States  than  in  an  island  country  like  Great  Britain.  The  distribu- 
tion of  naval  bases  is  fully  as  important  as  the  size  of  naval  forces  in  estimat- 
ing the  ability  of  a country  to  defend  this  interest  by  force. 

The  defense  of  policies  may  involve  both  land  and  sea  forces.  Where  both 
are  unduly  large,  there  is  ground  for  suspecting  that  an  aggressive  policy  is 
intended.  The  principal  American  policies  are  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the 
Open  Door  in  China.  A careful  study  of  these  policies  to  ascertain  their 
defensive  or  offensive  character  is  essential  for  understanding  the  American 
naval  problem. 

Readings  : 

Anderson,  Frank  M.  and  Amos  S.  Hershey,  Diplomatic  History,  Washington,  1918 

pp.  468-474- 

Angell,  Norman  (Pseud,  for  Ralph  Norman  Angell  Lane),  The  Fruits  of  Victory, 
New  York,  1921. 

, The  Great  Illusion,  3rd  edition.  New  York,  1911. 

Borah,  Senator  W.  E.,  Address  in  United  States  Senate  on  Naval  Armament, 
March  i,  1921,  Congressional  Record,  60:4168-4170. 

Brown,  Rome  G.,  Development  of  United  States  Militarism,  The  Nation,  113:  526, 
November  9,  1921. 

Butler,  Nicholas  Murray.  Are  We  Our  Brother’s  Keeper?  The  International  Mind, 
New  York,  1912,  pp.  47-66;  Opening  Address  at  the  Lake  Mohonk  Conference  on 
International  Arbitration,  1910,  International  Conciliation,  No.  43. 

Bywater,  Hector  C.,  Sea  Power  in  the  Pacific,  a study  of  the  American- Japanese 
Naval  Problem,  London,  1921. 

Callwell,  Major  C.  E.,  The  Effect  of  Maritime  Command  on  Land  Campaigns  since 
Waterloo,  London,  1897.  (Continues  Mahan’s  line  of  historical  investigation.) 


Corbett,  Julian  S.,  Some  Principles  of  Maritime  Strategy,  London,  1918.  (A  stand- 
ard work.  Chapter  I reviews  principles  developed  by  the  great  writers  on  mili- 
tary strategy,  Clausewitz  and  Jomini.) 

Haldane,  Viscount,  Before  the  War,  1920,  pp.  57-72. 

Hannay,  David,  Development  of  Navies,  1815-1910,  Encyclopedia  Britannica, 
nth  ed.,  “Navy,”  19:  309-312. 

Hurd,  Archibald,  The  British  Fleet  in  the  Great  War,  London,  1918. 

, Naval  Supremacy,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  Fortnightly 

Review,  108:  916-930,  December,  1920. 

Interparliamentary  Union,  Documents  Nos.  i to  6,  1910-1911.  (Reprints  par- 
liamentary debates  and  resolutions  indicating  the  attitude  of  the  powers  on 
armament  limitation  before  the  war.) 

Kerr,  Mark,  The  Problem  of  Navies.  What  Will  Command  the  Sea?  The  Nine- 
teenth Century,  September,  1921,  pp.  383-392. 

Lake  Mohonk  Conference  on  International  Arbitration,  Report  of  21st  Confer- 
ence, 1915,  pp.  65-98.  (Discussion  by  T.  S.  Woolsey,  Secretary  of  War  Lindley 
M.  Garrison,  President  John  Grier  Hibben,  Major-General  Leonard  Wood, 
Norman  Angell,  Rear  Admiral  Colby  M.  Chester.) 

Leyland,  John,  The  Problem  of  Navies.  The  Washington  Conference  and  its  Pow- 
ers. The  Nineteenth  Century,  September,  1921,  pp.  393-402. 

Loreburn,  Earl,  How  the  War  Came,  London,  1919,  pp.  1-20. 

Mahan,  Alfred  T.,  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  on  History.  (Extracts  from  this  and 
other  historical  works  of  Admiral  Mahan,  together  with  extracts  from  his  works 
on  naval  strategy  and  policy  have  been  conveniently  brought  together  in 
“Mahan  on  Naval  Warfare,”  1918.) 

Murray,  Sir  Gilbert,  The  Problem  of  Foreign  Policy,  New  York,  1921,  pp.  100-107. 

, The  Foreign  Policy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Oxford,  1917. 

Pollen,  Arthur  H.,  Disarmament  in  its  Relation  to  the  Naval  Policy  of  the  United 
States.  International  Conciliation,  No.  161,  April,  1921. 

, The  Navy  in  Battle,  London,  1919,  pp.  32-79. 

War  Aims  of  Belligerents,  1918.  A League  of  Nations,  vol.  i.  No.  3,  February, 
1918.  (Contains  official  statements  of  attitude  of  Governments  on  President 
Wilson’s  IVth  point  of  January  8,  1918.) 

Wehberg,  Hans,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  pp.  48,  50,  87. 

United  States,  Hearings  of  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  January,  1921,  “Naval 
Policy  of  the  United  States.”  (Especially  statement  of  Admiral  Sims.) 

On  American  Foreign  Policy  the  following  are  particularly  recommended: 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of_  Intercourse  and 
Education,  Publication  No.  17,  American  Foreign  Policy. 

Coolidge,  A.  C.,  The  United  States  as  a World  Power,  New  York,  1908. 

Fish,  Carl  Russell,  American  Diplomacy,  New  York,  1916. 

Hart,  A.  B.,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  Boston,  1916. 

Hornbeck,  Stanley  K.,  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East,  New  York,  1916. 
Millard,  Thomas  F.,  Our  Eastern  Question,  New  York,  1916. 

, Democracy  and  the  Eastern  Question,  New  York,  1919. 

Moore,  J.  B.,  Principles  of  American  Diplomacy,  New  York,  1918. 

Willoughby,  W.  W.,  Foreign  Rights  and  Interests  in  China,  Baltimore,  1920. 


Questions  : 

1.  Did  the  acquisition  of  the  Philippines  have  an  effect  upon  the  size  of  the 
United  States  Navy?  Why?  Does  the  maintenance  of  the  open  door  policy 
have  any  relation  to  the  relative  size  of  the  navy? 

2.  What  were  the  occurrences  that  led  to  the  recognition  of  Japan  as  a 
“World  Power”?  Why  are  not  China,  Brazil,  and  Spain  “World  Powers?” 
When  did  the  United  States  become  a ‘World  Power?”  Comparing  “World 
Powers”  with  other  states  is  their  eminence  most  marked  in  population,  area, 
wealth,  culture,  army  or  navy? 

3.  What  is  the  relation  of  geographic  position  to  the  defensive  value  of 
naval  force?  Might  a navy  smaller  than  that  of  an  overseas  enemy  be  an 
absolute  defense  of  our  shores?  Would  a navy  double  the  size  of  an  overseas 
enemy  necessarily  be  adequate  for  attack  upon  it? 

4.  What  did  M.  Branting  of  Sweden  mean  when  he  said  in  the  27th  Plenary 
meeting  of  the  2nd  assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations,  “The  security  based  on 
armament  is  of  a very  relative  nature?”  What  effect  is  naval  building  likely 
to  have  on  a)  foreign  alliances,  b)  foreign  naval  building?  Give  illustrations 
from  recent  history. 

5.  Have  the  developments  of  the  World  War  affected  the  value  of  the 
capital  ship?  What  is  the  relation  of  this  controversy  to  the  possibility  of 
reducing  naval  budgets? 

6.  Has  naval  building  usually  had  reference  to  the  carrying  out  of  con- 
crete foreign  policies?  Should  it? 

7.  Is  it  true  that  navies  are  essentially  defensive,  armies  offensive? 

8.  Assuming  that  the  United  States  wishes  to  maintain  the  open  door 
policy,  would  you  advise  neutralizing  the  Pacific  Islands,  including  the  Philip- 
pines? Would  you  advise  disarming  these  Islands  without  a guarantee  of  their 
neutrality?  What  is  the  status  of  the  mandatory  islands  in  the  Pacific  in  these 
respects? 

9.  Explain  the  policies  or  conditions  which  have  been  back  of  the  British 
demand  for  the  largest  navy;  the  French  refusal  to  accept  the  League  of 
Nations  recommendation  for  a non-augmentation  of  military  budgets  for  two 
years  in  1921;  the  German  naval  program  begun  in  1900;  the  United  States 
“second  to  none”  naval  program  of  1916. 

10.  Can  armaments  for  defense  be  distinguished  from  armaments  for 
offense?  What  strategical  operations  would  you  suggest  in  case  it  were  decided 
to  employ  force  to  maintain  the  open  door  in  China? 

11.  What  do  you  understand  by  militarism?  Can  the  relative  militarism 
of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Japan  be  estimated  from  the  fact  that 
in  1921  they  spent  respectively  33%,  24%  and  51%  of  their  national  budgets 
for  the  army  and  navy?  Can  it  be  estimated  from  the  fact  that  the  average  per 
capita  expense  for  military  establishments  in  1921  was  United  States,  $9.07; 
British  Empire,  $2.59;  Japan,  $5.19.  Can  it  be  estimated  from  the  fact  that 


the  total  cost  for  military  establishments  in  1921  was  United  States,  $1,079 
million;  Great  Britain,  $1,145  million;  Japan,  $399  million, 
j.  Relation  of  Armaments  to  International  Organization. 

Some  have  considered  disarmament  a necessary  prerequisite  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  effective  agencies  for  international  cooperation  and  pacific  settle- 
ment of  disputes;  others  have  considered  the  establishment  of  such  agencies  a 
necessary  prerequisite  to  disarmament.  A larger  number  hold  that  arma- 
ment limitation  and  international  organization  reciprocally  aid  each  other, 
though  many  of  these  think  that  certain  questions  will  always  remain  outside 
the  scope  of  machinery  for  peaceful  settlement.  The  types  of  international 
organization  proposed  for  eliminating  the  demand  for  armaments  fall  into 
four  groups,  typical  respectively  of  jurists,  economists,  military  men  and 
statesmen. 

Jurists  are  apt  to  support  proposals  for  international  courts,  arbitration 
tribunals,  and  councils  of  inquiry  and  conciliation  as  the  best  means  of 
diminishing  armament,  on  the  theory  that,  with  these  agencies  for  adjusting 
disputes  peacefully,  armaments  will  be  unnecessary  (Barclay,  Pollock). 
Economists  are  apt  to  regard  armaments  as  tools  for  gaining  commercial  and 
economic  advantages,  particularly  in  undeveloped  regions  of  the  earth,  and 
so  propose  plans  for  cooperation  in  commercial  development  through  con- 
tinually active  institutions  of  mutual  advantage  as  a means  for  ameliorating 
this  rivalry  (Garvin,  Dawson).  Military  men  characteristically  look  upon 
force  as  the  essence  of  all  human  organization  and  propose  schemes  for  pooling 
forces  in  an  international  police  power  with  the  sole  object  of  suppressing  war 
(Miles,  Davies,  Vestal).  Statesmen  are  apt  to  rely  on  the  possibilities  of 
compromise  through  discussion  and  the  focusing  of  public  opinion,  and  so 
favor  an  international  organization  assuring  delay  and  full  opportunity  for 
conference  before  hostilities  are  resorted  to  (Bryce,  Wilson).  All  of  these  plans 
are  utilized  in  the  League  of  Nations  with  its  international  court  and  system 
of  arbitration  (Arts.  12-15),  its  mandatory  system  and  stipulations  for 
equality  of  commercial  advantages  and  international  cooperation  (22-24), 
its  guarantees  against  aggressive  war  (10,  16)  and  its  provisions  for  con- 
ciliation and  discussion  (2-6,  ii). 

Readings  : 

Barclay,  Sir  Thomas,  New  Methods  of  Adjusting  International  Disputes  and  the 
Future,  London,  1917,  pp.  128-134. 

Bryce,  Viscount  James,  Essays  and  Addresses  in  War  Time,  London,  1919, 
pp.  173-174- 

Butler,  Nicholas  Murray,  The  International  Mind,  New  York,  1912,  pp.  97-114; 
Reports  of  Lake  Mohonk  Conference  on  International  Arbitration,  1912; 
International  Conciliation,  No.  55. 

Daniels,  Josephus,  Hearing,  House  of  Representatives,  Committee  on  Naval 
Affairs,  January,  1921.  p.  529  et  seq. 


[28I 


Davies,  Major  David  (Great  Britain),  Proceedings  Grotius  Society,  5:  109-127 
(1919),  Proceedings  2Qth  Conference  of  International  Law  Association,  1920, 
pp.  92-107. 

Dawson,  William  Harbutt,  The  Problems  of  the  Peace,  London,  1918,  pp.  321-324. 
Garvin,  J.  L.,  The  Economic  Foundations  of  Peace,  London,  1919,  pp.  457-487. 
Hobson,  R.  P.,  Disarmament,  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  2:743 
(1908) 

League  of  Nations;  official  documents: 

Covenant,  Articles  i,  8,  9,  22,  23. 

Reports  of  Secretary  General  to  First  (Document  37)  and  Second  Assemblies 
(Document  9)  on  the  work  of  the  Council. 

Report  of  Sixth  Committee  of  First  Assembly,  on  Armaments,  December,  1920, 
(Document  199). 

Report  of  Temporary  Mixed  Commission  on  Armaments  to  Second  Assembly, 
September,  1921  (Document  81). 

Report  of  Third  Committee  of  Second  Assembly,  on  Armaments,  September, 
1921  (Document  158). 

Proces  Verbaux  of  Sixth  Committee  of  First  Assembly,  December,  1920,  and 
Third  Committee  of  Second  Assembly,  September,  1921. 

Verbatim  record  of  Plenary  Meetings  22  and  23  of  First  Assembly  and  27  of 
Second  Assembly. 

(This  material  should  be  in  any  good  library  and  much  of  it  has  been  reprinted 
in  “The  League  of  Nations,”  published  by  the  World  Peace  Foundation  of 
Boston,  vols.  3,  and  4.  The  League  of  Nations  Official  Journal  contains  most 
of  the  documents  of  the  Council,  but  not  of  the  Assembly.) 

Mahan,  A.  T.,  Armaments  and  Arbitration,  New  York,  1912. 

Maurice,  F.,  The  Limitation  of  Armaments,  Contemporary  Review,  October,  1921, 
pp.  435-440- 

Miles,  Major  Sherman,  The  Sword  and  its  Sheath,  Saturday  Evening  Post,  May  28, 
1921,  p.  21. 

Ogg,  F.  A.,  International  Sanctions  and  the  Limitation  of  Armaments,  in  Duggan, 
The  League  of  Nations,  1919,  pp.  1 12-127. 

Pollock,  Sir  Frederick,  The  League  of  Nations,  London,  1919. 

Scott,  James  Brown,  The  Hague  Peace  Conference  of  i8gg  and  igoj,  Baltimore, 
1909,  1:694-697. 

Trueblood,  B.  F.,  The  Case  for  Limitation  of  Armaments,  American  Journal  of 
International  Law,  2:  758  (1908). 

Vestal,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  S.  C.,  The  Maintenance  of  Peace,  1921. 

Wehberg,  Hans,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  pp.  43-46. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  Addresses,  January  22,  1917  and  January  8,  1918  (14  points). 
World  Friendship,  Disarmament  Number,  vol.  i.  No.  6,  March,  1921,  especially 
letters  from  Harry  Emerson  Fosdick  (p.  7),  F.  M.  North  (p.  10),  Raymond  B. 
Fosdick(p.  12),  Senator  G.  M.  Hitchcock  (p.  13),  Hon.  Theodore  Marburg (p.  13). 

Questions  : 

I.  Has  the  development  of  international  arbitration  resulted  in  a decrease 
in  armaments? 


2.  Are  armaments  a cause  or  a symptom?  If  you  consider  them  a symptom , 
what  is  the  cause?  What  cure  do  you  suggest? 

3.  Trace  the  steps  taken  by  the  League  of  Nations  toward  limiting  arma- 
ments. What  particular  obstacles  has  the  League  had  to  contend  with  in  this 
work? 

4.  Would  a League  of  Nations  which  attempted  to  compel  the  submission 
of  all  disputes  to  judicial  settlement,  arbitration  or  conciliation  lead  to  the 
reduction  of  armaments? 

5.  What  features  of  the  League  of  Nations  Covenant  do  you  consider  most 
likely  to  prove  helpful  toward  limiting  armaments? 

6.  Is  a limitation  of  armaments  possible  without  a machinery  capable  of 
continuous  supervision? 

7.  Is  a limitation  of  armaments  possible  without  machinery  for  settling 
controversies  otherwise  than  by  force  of  arms?  Is  diplomacy  adequate  for  this 
task? 

B.  LEGAL  ASPECTS 
4.  Local  disarmament  and  neutralization. 

Efforts  have  been  made  to  limit  the  area  of  war  and  its  effect  on  peaceful 
commerce  by  the  neutralization  or  disarmament  of  special  areas  such  as  small 
states,  international  boundaries,  islands  and  undeveloped  regions,  straits  and 
canals.  It  should  be  noticed  that  neutralization  has  not  always  been  accom- 
panied by  disarmament;  in  fact  Belgium  and  Switzerland  have  maintained 
armies  and  fortifications  for  the  defense  of  their  status.  On  the  other  hand 
boundary  areas  have  often  been  disarmed  without  neutralization,  sometimes 
by  peaceful  agreement,  sometimes  by  compulsion  of  a victorious  state. 
Declared  neutralization,  which  other  states  merely  agree  to  respect,  should 
be  distinguished  from  guaranteed  neutralization,  which  they  agree  to  protect. 

Readings  : 

Kmos,S\).e\don, Political  and  Legal  Remedies  for  War,  New  York,  1880,  pp.  143-159, 
Barclay,  Sir  Thomas,  Problems  of  International  Practice  and  Diplomacy,  1907, 
PP-  73-79.  153.  180. 

, Collapse  and  Reconstruction,  1919,  p.  202. 

Belgian  Gray  Book,  1914,  II,  Nos.  54,  58.  (Correspondence  in  respect  to  neutraliza- 
tion of  Belgian  Congo,  1914),  Scott,  Diplomatic  Documents  Relating  to  the  Out- 
break of  the  European  War,  pp.  480,  483;  International  Conciliation,  No  86. 
Foster,  J.  W.,  Report  on  the  Great  Lakes  Armament  Agreement  of  1817,  Fifty-Second 
Congress,  Second  Session,  Senate  Extra  Document,  No.  9,  reprinted  by  Car- 
negie Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  International  Law, 
Pamphlet  No.  2. 

Garner,  J.  W.,  International  Law  and  the  World  War,  London,  1920,  2:  186-256. 
Interparliamentary  Union: 

Annuaire,  1911,  pp.  38-42;  1914,  pp.  36-39.  (Discussion  of  neutralization  of 
straits  and  canals.) 


Annuaire,  1914,  pp.  39-50.  (Discussion  of  neutralization  by  declaration.) 
Levermore,  Charles  H.,  The  Anglo-American  Agreement  for  Disarmament  of  the 
Great  Lakes,  World  Peace  Foundation,  Pamphlet  Series,  vol.  4,  No.  4.  (June, 
1914.) 

Neutralization  Treaties,  texts,  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  Supplement 
3:io6etseq.  (1909). 

Oppenheim,  L.,  International  Law,  third  edition,  London,  1920,  i:  171-179. 
Vestal,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  S.  C.,  The  Maintenance  of  Peace,  1920,  pp.  410-422. 
Wehberg,  Hans,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  pp.  26-28,  66. 

Winslow,  Erving,  Neutralization,  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  2:  366- 
386  (1908). 

Questions  : 

1.  What  is  the  difference  between  neutrality  and  neutralization  under 
international  law?  Which  term  should  apply  to  Belgium  in  1914?  Which  to 
the  United  States,  1914-1917? 

2.  Would  you  advise  a neutralized  state  to  disarm?  Cite  examples  of  dis- 
armed neutralization. 

3.  Cite  examples  of  disarmed  international  boundaries.  What  has  been  the 
purpose  of  such  measures?  Has  it  been  attained? 

4.  The  neutralization  of  the  Philippine  Islands  has  been  suggested.  Would 
you  favor  such  a policy  as  a measure  for  preserving  peace? 

5.  Are  mandatories  under  the  League  of  nations  neutralized?  Are  they 
disarmed? 

6.  What  was  the  effect  of  the  neutralization  of  the  Panama  Canal  during 
the  World  War?  Of  the  Suez  Canal?  Of  the  Congo  Basin? 

7.  Explain  the  proposal  of  the  Interparliamentary  Union  for  voluntary 
neutralization  of  “buffer  states.”  What  was  the  purpose  of  this  proposal? 
Would  it  be  effective? 

5.  Regulation  of  methods  and  instruments  of  war. 

The  regulation  of  instruments  of  warfare  should  be  distinguished  from  the 
regulation  of  the  methods  of  using  such  instruments.  International  Law  for- 
bids the  use  of  any  weapon  in  a manner  involving  perfidy  causing  unneces- 
sary suffering  to  enemy  forces,  unnecessarily  destroying  enemy  civilian  com- 
fort or  property,  or  unnecessarily  inconveniencing  neutral  traders.  The  last 
question  involves  the  rules  assuring  “freedom  of  the  seas.”  A few  instruments 
of  war,  such  as  small  explosive  bullets,  expanding  bullets,  poison  gases,  have 
been  prohibited  by  convention  and  the  prohibition  of  submarine  vessels,  air 
craft  and  other  instruments  has  been  suggested.  The  prohibition  of  instru- 
ments of  war  because  of  their  essential  cruelty,  should  be  distinguished  from 
proposals  to  prohibit  battleships  and  guns  above  a certain  size  because  of 
their  great  expense. 


Readings  : 

a.  Instruments  of  Warfare: 

Domville-Fife,  Charles,  Submarines  and  Sea  Power,  London,  1919,  pp.  89-116. 

Garner,  J.  W.,  International  Law  and  the  World  War,  1920,  i : 277. 

Hague  Peace  Conferences,  1899,  1907: 

Reports  of  Captains  Crozier  and  Mahan  on  the  work  of  the  first  committee, 
1899.  (Carnegie  Endowment  edition  of  Instructions  and  Reports  of  Amer- 
ican Delegates  to  the  Hague  Conferences.) 

Proceedings  of  First  Commission,  1899,  Carnegie  Endowment  edition  of 
Proceedings. 

Reports  to  the  Hague  Conferences,  1899,  1907,  Carnegie  Endowment  Edi- 
tion, pp.  169-174,  645-693. 

Higgins,  A.  P.,  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences,  Cambridge,  1909,  pp.  1-7,  484- 
497.  (Contains  texts  of  Declarations  of  Paris,  St.  Petersburg  and  the  Hague 
on  instruments  of  war.) 

League  of  Nations,  Opinion  of  Permanent  Advisory  Committee  on  Gas  War- 
fare {Official  Journal  of  the  League  of  Nations,  November-December,  1920, 
P-  39)-  See  also  reports  on  League  of  Nations  publications  cited  section  3, 
supra. 

Maine,  Sir  Henry  Sumner,  International  Law,  1888,  p.  139. 

Pollock,  Sir  Frederick,  The  League  of  Nations,  1920,  pp.  I15  et  seq. 

Versailles,  Treaty  of.  Articles  171,  172,  191,  198,  201.  (Prohibits  use  of  various 
war  instruments  by  Germany.) 

Weh berg,, Hans,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  p.  17-27. 

Wright,  Quincy,  The  Effect  of  the  War  on  International  Law,  Minnesota  Law 
Review,  5:  523,  June,  1921. 

b.  Freedom  of  the  Seas: 

Amos,  Sheldon,  Political  and  Legal  Remedies  for  War,  New  York,  1880,  pp.  196- 
216. 

Balfour,  A.  J.,  Freedom  of  the  Seas,  New  York  Times,  Current  History,  4:  719, 
July,  1916. 

Bowles,  Thomas  Gibson,  The  Declaration  of  Paris,  London,  1900. 

, Sea  Law  and  Sea  Power,  London,  1910. 

Choate,  Joseph  H.,  Immunity  of  Private  Property  at  Sea  (address  before  fourth 
commission  of  Second  Hague  Peace  Conference,  June  28,  1907)  World  Peace 
Foundation,  Pamphlet  Series,  vol.  4 No.  2 (1914). 

Grotius,  Hugo,  The  Freedom  of  the  Seas,  published  by  the  Carnegie  Endowment 
for  International  Peace,  Division  of  International  Law. 

Hague  Peace  Conference,  1907,  Reports,  Carnegie  Endowment  Edition, 
PP-  599-644- 

London,  Naval  Conference,  1909.  See  Higgins,  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences 
and  Bowles,  supra. 

Loreburn,  Earl,  Capture  at  Sea,  London,  1913. 

Mahan,  Admiral  A.  T.  and  Corbett,  Julian  S.,  Some  Neglected  Aspects  of  War, 
London,  1907. 

Piggott,  Sir  Francis,  The  Law  of  the  Sea  Series.  (Volumes  published  by  the 


University  of  London  Press  containing  all  important  documents  on  the  sub- 
ject with  commentary.) 

Wehberg,  Hans,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  pp.  52-53. 

, Capture  in  War  on  Land  and  Sea,  London,  1911. 

c.  Rules  of  Land  Warfare: 

Amos,  Sheldon,  Political  and  Legal  Remedies  for  War,  New  York,  1880,  pp.  216- 
245- 

Hague  Conferences,  1899,  1907.  Convention  H of  1899  and  IV  of  1907.  (See 
Carnegie  Endowment  edition  of  Proceedings  and  Reports.) 

Higgins,  A.  P.,  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences,  1899,  1907,  pp.  206-280. 

Questions  : 

1.  What  conclusion  do  you  draw  from  the  world  war  with  reference  to  the 
prohibition  of  weapons  which  though  cruel  are  effective? 

2.  Would  the  prohibition  of  battleships  over  35,000  tons  benefit  most  a 
wealthy  or  a poor  nation?  A nation  with  many  naval  bases  or  a nation  with 
few? 

3.  Answer  the  same  question  with  reference  to  submarines,  bombing  air- 
craft, poison  gases. 

4.  What  do  you  understand  by  “The  Freedom  of  the  Seas?”  Does  it  imply 
an  absolute  liberty  of  neutrals  to  trade  with  belligerents  in  time  of  war? 

5.  Would  a high  degree  of  immunity  for  peaceful  trade  in  time  of  war 
benefit  most  a country  dependent  on  commerce  for  sustenance  or  a self  sus- 
taining country?  a country  with  a widely  scattered  territory  or  a compact 
country? 

6.  What  conclusion  would  you  draw  from  the  world  war,  with  reference 
to  the  military  effectiveness  of  war  on  commerce? 

7.  Does  the  elaboration  of  rules  of  land  warfare  have  any  effect  upon  lessen- 
ing the  probability  of  war?  Do  belligerents  actually  observe  such  rules  of  war? 
Why  should  they? 

6.  Regulation  of  methods  of  acquiring  war  materials  and  forces. 

Plans  for  limiting  armaments  would  be  ineffective  or  at  least  inequitable  if 
the  problem  of  private  manufacture  of  and  trade  in  arms  were  wholly  ignored. 
For  instance  a prohibition  of  government  warship  building  would  be  ineffec- 
tive if  private  firms  could  prepare  warships  for  transfer  to  the  government  at 
a moment’s  notice.  The  right  of  converting  merchant  vessels  to  warships  in 
time  of  war  is  here  involved.  Furthermore  private  manufacture  and  unregu- 
lated trade  in  war  material  has  been  considered  by  many  an  evil  in  itself 
because  of  the  private  interest  it  creates  in  war  scares  and  wars. 

Readings  : 

a.  Private  arms  industry: 

Barclay,  Sir  Thomas,  Collapse  and  Reconstruction,  1919,  p.  185. 

Brailsford,  H.  N.,  The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold,  1914. 


(33] 


Dawson,  William  Harbutt,  The  Problems  of  the  Peace,  London,  1918,  pp. 
321-324. 

League  of  Nations,  Covenant,  Article  8 and  reports  referred  to  in  Section  3, 
supra. 

Pollock,  Sir  Frederick,  The  League  of  Nations,  1920,  pp.  115,  et  seq. 

Snowden,  Philip,  Dreadnaughts  and  Dividends,  World  Peace  Foundation, 
Pamphlet  Series,  August,  1914. 

Wehberg,  Hans,  Die  Internationale  Beschrdnkung  der  Riistungen,  1919,  pp.  341- 
360. 

, Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  p.  51. 

b.  Arms  Trade: 

League  of  Nations: 

Covenant,  Articles  22,  23d. 

Report  of  Sir  Cecil  Hurst  attached  to  report  of  Sixth  Committee,  First 
Assembly  of  League  of  Nations  (Document  199). 

See  also  other  reports  cited  section  3 supra. 

Saint  Germain  Convention  on  Arms  Trade,  1919,  printed  in  International  Con- 
ciliation.  No.  164,  July,  1921. 

War  trade  of  neutrals,  see  Hague  Conventions,  1907,  V Article  7,  XIII, 
Article  7 and  correspondence  of  United  States  with  Germany  and  Austria  on 
the  subject,  1915-1917.  {American  Journal  of  International  Law,  Special 
Supplements,  vols.  9-1 1,  reprinting  State  Department  White  books,  Euro- 
pean war.  Nos.  1-4.) 

c.  Conscription  and  methods  of  recruitment. 

Amos,  Sheldon,  Political  and  Legal  Remedies  for  War,  New  York,  1880,  pp. 
162-180. 

Smuts,  General,  Draft  of  League  of  Nations  Covenant,  The  Nation,  New  York, 
February  8,  1919,  108-225. 

Versailles,  Treaty,  Articles  1 73-1 79.  (Regulates  German  methods  of  recruit- 
ing forces.) 

Wehberg,  Hans,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  p.  76. 

d.  Privateering,  arming  and  conversion  of  merchant  vessels: 

Hague  Conference,  1907,  Convention  VII  (conversion  of  merchant  vessels). 

Reports,  Carnegie  Endowment  edition,  pp.  590-599. 

Higgins,  A.  P.,  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences,  Cambridge,  1909  (on  Declara- 
tion of  Paris,  and  VII  Hague  Convention). 

United  States  correspondence  with  Great  Britain  and  Germany  on  right  of 
conversion  and  arming  merchant  vessels.  (Publications  cited  in  (&)  supra. 

Questions: 

1.  What  would  be  the  effect  of  a prohibition  of  arms  trade  and  private 
manufacture  of  arms  on  the  “right  of  revolution”?  Would  it  be  constitutional 
for  the  United  States  to  enter  into  treaties  on  these  subjects? 

2.  Would  an  agreement  to  prohibit  the  export  of  war  material  to  specified 
unsettled  areas  of  the  world  be  effective  if  a single  manufacturing  state  were 
not  included? 


[34] 


3-  Why  has  the  attitude  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain  differed  on  the 
subject  of  converting  merchant  vessels  to  war  vessels  on  the  high  seas?  Why 
has  it  differed  on  the  subject  of  arming  merchant  vessels? 

4.  What  are  the  evils  of  conscription?  Why  did  France  and  Italy  oppose 
the  abolition  of  conscription  when  the  League  of  Nations  Covenant  was 
being  considered  in  the  Paris  Peace  Conference? 

5.  Has  the  United  States  ever  made  any  treaties  or  passed  any  laws  pro- 
hibiting arms  trade  by  Americans? 

C.  TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
7.  Armament  limitation  agreements  of  limited  application. 

Theorists  have  often  proposed  plans  for  limiting  armaments,  applicable  to 
all  states  and  all  times.  Practical  schemes,  however,  have  usually  been  very 
concrete  as  to  states  involved  and  time  of  operation.  Practical  statesmen 
have  not  been  willing  to  bind  themselves  for  an  unprophesiable  future  nor  to 
commit  themselves  to  principles  of  universal  application.  Unilateral  decreases 
of  armament  as  a matter  of  national  policy  have  sometimes  occurred  as  well  as 
unilateral  increases,  and  this  “disarmament  by  example”  has  been  favored  by 
some  as  the  best  means  of  bringing  about  a general  reduction.  (W.  J.  Bryan, 
Letter,  February  9,  1921  printed  in  World  Friendship,  vol.  i.  No.  6,  p.  18, 
March,  1921;  The  Nation,  113:  520,  November  9,  1921.) 

Compulsory  unilateral  disarmament  has  also  occurred,  usually  in  treaties 
ending  war.  Thus  the  treaties  of  Peace  have  disarmed  Germany,  Austria, 
Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  by  imposing  fixed  limits  on  the  size  of  their 
military  and  naval  forces  and  material,  abolishing  conscription,  requiring  the 
razing  of  certain  fortresses,  and  prohibiting  the  use  of  air  forces  and  sub- 
marines. There  are  examples  of  bilateral  treaties  agreeing  to  concrete  diminu- 
tions of  naval  forces  for  a limited  time  and  agreements  to  limit  the  personnel 
of  land  forces  have  been  proposed.  No  agreement  has  yet  been  made  embody- 
ing general  principles  for  the  limitation  of  armaments. 

Readings  : 

United  States,  Hearings  of  House  of  Representatives  Committee  on  Naval 

Affairs,  January-February,  1921,  “Disarmament.” 

Wehberg,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  pp.  55-58,  64,  72. 

(See  also  Historical  Resume  supra  and  references  there  given.) 

Questions  : 

1.  Why  is  it  easier  to  make  armament  agreements  between  few  than 
between  many  states?  Which  type  of  agreement  is  likely  to  be  best  observed? 

2.  What  is  the  advantage  of  stating  a definite  time  at  which  such  an  agree- 
ment expires?  What  duration  would  you  suggest  for  a naval  limitation  agree- 
ment between  the  United  States,  Japan  and  Great  Britain? 

[35] 


3.  Would  a series  of  “regional  understandings”  for  reducing  land  arma- 
ments be  preferable  to  a general  treaty?  Why? 

8.  General  armament  limitation  agreements. 

A general  agreement  for  limiting  armaments  involves  determination  of 
national  ratios  and  units  of  military  force,  both  very  difficult  matters.  The 
factors  which  go  to  make  military  and  naval  force  are  men,  money,  and 
materials.  Each  has  been  suggested  as  a suitable  unit  for  estimating  relative 
strength.  The  total  number  of  enlisted  men  and  officers  is  more  significant  of 
the  strength  of  land  forces  than  of  naval  forces,  but  in  either  case,  equal  num- 
bers may  represent  greatly  differing  strengths  because  of  differences  in  organ- 
ization, and  number  of  trained  reserves.  Expenditures,  because  of  the  varying 
purchasing  power  of  money  in  the  different  countries,  especially  the  varying 
wages  of  soldiers,  seamen  and  laborers,  furnish  a poor  index  of  actual  incre- 
ments to  military  and  naval  strength,  besides  which  budgets  are  easily  camou- 
flaged. Material  units  furnish  a much  better  basis  for  estimating  naval  than 
land  strength  but  comparison  of  naval  units  is  difficult  because  of  the  differ- 
ences in  type  and  ages  of  vessels.  The  gross  tonnage  of  naval  vessels  furnishes 
a rough  index  to  naval  strength  though  probably  the  total  tonnage  of  capital 
ships  (battle  ships  and  battle  cruisers)  is  preferable. 

Determination  of  proper  national  ratios  is  even  more  difficult.  The  League 
of  Nations  has  suggested  that  disarmament  should  be  achieved  in  three  steps, 
i)  “Limitation"  of  armament  would  take  the  present  ratio  of  military  and 
naval  strength  as  a basis.  2)  “Reduction”  of  armaments  would  be  based  on 
equitable  ratios  determined  by  factors  statistically  measurable  such  as  popula- 
tion, area,  commerce,  wealth,  length  of  coast  line,  etc.,  selected  so  as  to  indi- 
cate political  importance.  Several  writers  have  proposed  that  military  and 
naval  budgets  be  limited  to  a definite  ratio  of  total  budgets  and  that  military 
personnel  be  limited  to  a fixed  proportion  of  the  population.  5)  “Disarma- 
ment” would  fix  the  maximum  military  and  naval  strength  of  each  state  by 
its  needs  for  internal  police,  defense  against  savage  tribes  and  states  not  in 
the  agreement,  contributions  to  an  international  police  force  and  other  pur- 
poses unrelated  to  international  rivalries. 

Readings  : 

Coulet,  Limitation  des  Armaments,  Paris,  1910,  p.  230. 

Hague  Conference  of  1899,  Documents  Respecting  Limitation  of  Armaments,  pre- 
pared by  the  Government  of  the  Netherlands,  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
International  Peace,  Pamphlets  Nos.  22,  36. 

Interparliamentary  Union,  Reports  of  Commission  for  Limitation  of  Naval  and 
Military  Expenses,  by  M.  D’Estournelles  de  Constant,  Proceedings,  1906,  1911. 
Extracts  printed  in  World  Peace  Foundation,  Pamphlet  Series,  April,  1911,  p.  14. 

, Report  of  Secretary  Christian  Lange  on  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting 

Peace,  1917,  pp.  46-53* 


[36] 


League  of  Nations,  Covenant,  Article  8;  Reports  referred  to.  Section  3,  supra. 
League  of  Nations  Union,  London,  Report  of  Committee  on  Limitation  of  Arma- 
ments, June  23,  1921. 

Maurice,  F.,  The  Limitation  of  Armaments,  Contemporary  Review,  October,  1921, 
pp.  435-440. 

Nation,  The,  New  York,  Editorial,  113:  520,  November  9,  1921. 

Pollock,  Sir  Frederick,  The  League  of  Nations,  1920,  pp.  113  et  seq. 

Toinet,  R.,  La  Limitation  Conventionnelle  des  Armements,  Paris,  1912, 

Wehberg,  Hans,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  pp.  44-45,  49,  60-63, 73-75,  78-81. 
■,  Die  Internationale  Beschrankung  der  Rustungen,  Stuttgart,  1919,  361-384. 

Questions  : 

1.  The  United  States  appropriated  537  million  dollars  for  the  navy  in  the 
fiscal  year  ending  1921,  Great  Britain  330  million  dollars  and  Japan  25S 
million  dollars.  Does  this  give  any  evidence  as  to  which  added  to  its  naval 
force  the  most  in  that  year? 

2.  What  factors  would  have  to  be  considered  to  compare  properly  the 
military  personnel  of  France  and  the  United  States? 

3.  Would  the  number  of  naval  bases  have  to  be  considered  to  make  a just 
comparison  of  the  naval  force  of  two  powers?  What  of  fuel  supplies? 

4.  In  estimating  requirements  for  defense,  would  you  give  most  considera- 
tion to  physical  factors  (length  of  coast  line,  population,  domestic  supply  of 
food  and  raw  materials),  to  military  factors  (size  of  foreign  armies  and  navies), 
or  to  political  factors  (foreign  alliances,  probable  opponents  of  policy,  etc.)? 

5.  Is  the  present  ratio  of  military  and  naval  strength  an  equitable  ratio  to 
adopt  for  ten  years?  Can  you  suggest  anything  better? 

6.  What  is  the  unit  of  naval  force  adopted  in  Secretary  Hughes’  proposal 
for  naval  armament  limitation  of  November  12,  1921?  What  are  the  ratios 
adopted  for  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  Japan?  What  factors  were 
considered  in  determining  these  ratios? 

7.  Is  it  practical  to  limit  naval  armaments  by  agreement  without  limiting 
land  armaments? 

g.  Sanctions  for  observance  of  armament  limitation  agreement. 

The  willingness  of  states  to  accept  any  agreement  for  limiting  armaments 
depends  to  a considerable  extent  upon  their  confidence  in  its  fulfillment.  The 
sanctions  suggested  may  be  classified  as  a)  provisions  for  exchange  of  informa- 
tion, b)  provisions  for  appeal  to  an  international  court  on  suspicion  of  infrac- 
tion, right  of  investigation  mutually  or  by  an  international  commission,  c)  guar- 
antee of  the  agreement  by  an  obligation  of  all  states  to  act  as  an  international 
police  force  against  the  violator.  The  first  relies  on  good  faith,  the  second  on 
public  opinion,  the  third  on  force.  The  guarantee  of  an  armament  limitation 
agreement  should  be  distinguished  from  the  guarantee  of  a state’s  territory 


and  rights  under  international  law.  The  latter  guarantee  (discussed  section  3) 
is  much  more  comprehensive  than  a guarantee  merely  of  the  armament  limita- 
tion agreement,  though  states  sometimes  regard  it  as  essential  to  justify  any 
agreement  to  limit  armaments. 

Readings  : 

Butler,  Nicholas  Murray,  World  Armament  and  Public  Opinion,  The  Interna- 
tional Mind,  New  York,  1912,  pp.  21-44;  Opening  Address  at  the  Lake  Mohonk 
Conference  on  International  Arbitration,  1909,  International  Conciliation  No.  20. 
Davies,  David,  Grotius  Society,  Problems  of  Peace  and  War,  5:  109-118. 

Lake  Mohonk  Conference  on  International  Arbitration,  Report  of  21st  Confer- 
ence, 1915,  pp.  45-50. 

League  of  Nations:  Covenant  Article  9. 

French  amendments  proposed  to  Articles  8 and  9 of  the  Covenant,  Pollock, 
The  League  of  Nations,  1920,  p.  125. 

Report  of  International  Blockade  Committee,  Second  Assembly  Document 
No.  28. 

Report  of  Third  Committee  of  Second  Assembly  on  blockade. 

(See  other  reports  cited  Section  3,  supra.) 

Ogg,  F.  A.,  International  Sanctions  and  the  Limitation  of  Armaments,  Duggan, 
The  League  of  Nations,  1919,  pp.  1 12-125. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  Message  to  Congress,  December  6,  1904  and  Nobel  Prize 
address.  May  5,  1910.  (Extracts  printed  in  League  of  Nations,  World  Peace 
Foundation,  vol.  I,  No.  i,  October,  1917,  pp.  27-30.) 

Root,  E.,  The  Sanctions  of  International  Law,  American  Journal  of  International 
Law,  2:  451-457  (July,  1908). 

Scott,  James,  Brown,  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences  of  i8gg  and  igoy,  Baltimore, 
1909,  pp.  731-751- 

Tardieu,  Andre,  The  Truth  About  the  Treaty,  1921,  pp.  135-140. 

Vestal,  S.  C.,  The  Maintenance  of  Peace,  New  York,  1920,  pp.  476-483. 
Vollenhoven,  C.  von.  War  Obviated  by  an  International  Police,  1915.  (Series  of 
extracts  from  writing  of  prominent  statesmen  and  jurists.) 

Wehberg,  Hans,  Limitation  of  Armaments,  1921,  pp.  65,  82-94. 

Questions; 

1.  Why  has  France  considered  inclusion  of  the  right  of  investigation  and 
the  establishment  of  an  international  police  force,  a prerequisite  to  disarma- 
ment? 

2.  Why  have  the  questions  of  armament  limitation  and  international  block- 
ade been  put  under  the  same  Committee  in  the  League  of  Nations  Assembly 
meetings? 

3.  Would  states  be  more  likely  to  observe  an  agreement  for  limiting  battle* 
ship  construction  than  an  agreement  for  limiting  naval  budgets?  Why? 


PREVIOUS  PUBLICATIONS 


1919 

*Announcement  of  Founding  of  Institute. 


1920 

Bulletin  No.  i.  First  Annual  Report  of  the  Director. 

*Bulletin  No.  2.  For  Administrative  Authorities  of  Universities 
and  Colleges. 

*Bulletin  No.  3.  Observations  on  Higher  Education  in  Europe. 
Opportunities  for  Higher  Education  in  France. 

Opportunities  for  Graduate  Study  in  the  British  Isles. 


1921 

Bulletin  No.  i.  Second  Annual  Report  of  the  Director. 

Bulletin  No.  2.  Opportunities  for  Higher  Education  in  Italy. 
*Bulletin  No.  3.  Serial  of  an  International  Character. 

(Tentative  List  for  Libraries) 

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Bulletin  No.  6.  See  Syllabus  No.  VI I . 


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For  the  International  Relations  Clubs 

I.  Outline  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

II.  The  Past,  Present  and  Future  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 

III.  The  History  of  Russia  from  Earliest  Times. 

IV.  The  Russian  Revolution. 

V.  The  Question  of  the  Balkans. 

VI.  Modern  Mexican  History. 

VI I . Hispanic- American  History. 

VII I . The  Question  of  the  Near  East. 

IX.  China  Under  the  Republic. 

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XL  The  Political  and  Economic  Expansion  of  Japan. 
XII.  Limitation  of  Armament. 


I39] 


♦Out  of  print. 


ADVISORY  COUNCIL 


Addams,  Jane 
Alderman,  President  Edwin 
Ames,  Dean  Herman  V. 
Andrews,  Fanny  Fern 
Biggs,  Dr.  Herman 
Blakeslee,  Professor  G.  H. 
Brookings,  Robert  S. 

Bru^re,  Henry 
Bull,  Dr.  Carroll  G. 

Burton,  President  M.  L. 
Byrne,  James 

Coolidge,  Professor  Archibald 
Cravath,  Paul  D. 

Cunliffe,  Professor  J.  W. 
Davis,  Katherine  B. 

Downer,  Professor  Charles  A. 
Ely,  Professor  Richard  T. 
Filene,  A.  Lincoln 
Finley,  Dr.  John  H. 

Fosdick,  Dr.  Harry  E. 
Gilbert,  Cass 
Gildersleeve,  Dean  V.  C. 
Goodnow,  President  F.  J, 
Hadley,  Dr.  A.  T. 

Hale,  Dr.  George  E. 
Harrington,  Governor  E.  C. 
Hazen,  Professor  Charles  D. 
Hibben,  President  J.  G. 

Howe,  Professor  Henry  M. 
Hughes,  Hon.  Charles  E. 
Jenks,  Professor  Jeremiah 
Judson,  President  H.  P. 
Keppel,  Frederick  P. 

Keyser,  Professor  C.  J. 

Korff,  Baron  S.  A. 

Lovett,  President  Edgar 
Lowell,^  President  A.  L. 
MacCracken,  President  H.  N. 


Mali,  Pierre 

Main,  President  J.  H.  T. 
Mannes,  David 
Marling,  Alfred  E. 
Meiklejohn,  President  A. 
Milliken,  Professor  R.  A. 
Moore,  Professor  E.  H. 
Morgan,  William  Fellowes 
Neilson,  President  W.  A. 
Noyes,  Professor  Arthur  A. 
Payne,  President  Bruce  R. 
Pendleton,  President  Ellen  T. 
Pupin,  Professor  Michael  1. 
Putnam,  Herbert 
Richardson,  Dr.  E.  C. 
Robinson,  Dr.  Edward 
Sachs,  Professor  Julius 
Salmon,  Dr.  Thomas  W. 
Schwedtman,  Ferdinand  C. 
Severance,  Mrs.  C.  A. 
Shanklin,  President  W.  A. 
Shorey,  Professor  Paul 
Shotwell,  Professor  J.  T. 
Showerman,  Professor  Grant 
Stimson,  Henry  L. 

Stokes,  Dr.  Anson  Phelps 
Storey,  Professor  Thomas  A. 
Suzzallo,  President  Henry 
Thomas,  President  M.  Carey 
Todd,  Professor  Henry  A. 
Townsend,  Hon.  John  G. 
Vincent,  Dr.  George  E. 

Wald,  Lillian  D. 

White,  Professor  Henry  C. 
Wilkins,'  Professor  Ernest  H. 
Wilson,  Professor  George  G. 
Woodbridge,  Dean  F.  J.  E. 
Woolley,  President  Mary  E. 


